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ABSTRACT
Influence of Instrument Transformers on
Power System Protection. (May 2005)
Bogdan Naodovic, B.S., University of Novi Sad, Serbia and Montenegro
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Mladen Kezunovic
Instrument transformers are a crucial component of power system protection.
They supply the protection system with scaled-down replicas of current and voltage
signals present in a power network to the levels which are safe and practical to op-
erate with. The conventional instrument transformers are based on electromagnetic
coupling between the power network on the primary side and protective devices on
the secondary. Due to such a design, instrument transformers insert distortions in the
mentioned signal replicas. Protective devices may be sensitive to these distortions.
The influence of distortions may lead to disastrous misoperations of protective devices.
To overcome this problem, a new instrument transformer design has been devised:
optical sensing of currents and voltages. In the theory, novel instrument transform-
ers promise a distortion-free replication of the primary signals. Since the mentioned
novel design has not been widely used in practice so far, its superior performance
needs to be evaluated. This poses a question: how can the new technology (design)
be evaluated, and compared to the existing instrument transformer technology? The
importance of this question lies in its consequence: is there a necessity to upgrade
the protection system, i.e. to replace the conventional instrument transformers with
the novel ones, which would be quite expensive and time-consuming?
The posed question can be answered by comparing influences of both the novel
and the conventional instrument transformers on the protection system. At present,
iv
there is no systematic approach to this evaluation. Since the evaluation could lead to
an improvement of the overall protection system, this thesis proposes a comprehensive
and systematic methodology for the evaluation. The thesis also proposes a complete
solution for the evaluation, in the form of a simulation environment. Finally, the
thesis presents results of evaluation, along with their interpretation.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Objective of every power system is maintaining uninterrupted operation [1]. Protec-
tion is a part of power system, which ensures that effects of eventual faulty conditions
are minimized. One of the crucial components of protection system are instrument
transformers [2]. They provide access to high-magnitude currents and voltages on the
power network, by supplying protection with signal replicas scaled-down to levels that
are safe and practical (for use by protective gear). Correct and timely identification of
faults and disturbances (in the network) is dependent on accuracy of mentioned signal
replicas. Consequently, protection system operation is dependant on performance of
instrument transformers.
B. Definition of the Problem
The vast majority of instrument transformers installed today are conventional. Con-
ventional instrument transformers are based on electromagnetic coupling between
power network on the primary side, and protective devices on the secondary side [3].
Inherent to this coupling are signal distortions in various forms. These distortions
are, in a sense, artificial: they do not originate from the power network, but are
inserted by the coupling within the instrument transformers.
Protective devices may be sensitive to signal distortions, regardless of their
source. Field application has shown that this sensitivity may lead to disastrous miss-
This thesis follows the style of IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery.
2operations. To overcome this problem, two main approaches can be identified:
1. Improvement of protective devices, to make them less sensitive to distortions
2. Improvement of instrument transformers, to make them more accurate in de-
livering signal replicas
The second approach has resulted in so-called novel instrument transformer de-
signs. They are based on major advance in instrument transformer technology: opti-
cal sensing of currents and voltages [4]. Optical instrument transformers are referred
to as transducers. In theory, transducers have promising near-perfect performance,
virtually without signal distortions. In practice, small number of currently installed
transducers does not allow for making definite conclusions, whether the new technol-
ogy is required for improved protection relay operation, and whether it is justifiable
to replace conventional instrument transformers with transducers.
As stated above, the introduction of transducers is giving rise to a new problem:
uncertainty whether the new technology needs to replace the existing one to achieve
better overall relaying system. Following questions summarize this uncertainty:
1. What is the difference in performance between conventional instrument trans-
formers and transducers ?
2. How the impact of this difference can be practically measured or evaluated ?
This thesis will make an attempt at giving answers to these questions. First,
existing approaches to the problem study will be reviewed.
C. Existing Approaches to the Problem Study
Two main approaches toward the problem study can be identified in the available
literature:
31. Evaluation of instrument transformer response [5], [6],[7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]
2. Evaluation of performance of protective devices [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18],
[19], [20]
Neither of the approaches offers a solution that readily gives answers to the two
questions posed in the section B. However, they offer initial assessment of the problem
that can be further explored.
First approach, evaluation of instrument transformer response, is based on exam-
ining instrument transformer designs, as well as performance characteristics. Often
the objective of the approach is to derive models, that can be used in various power
system studies. The reasons for this is that traditionally instrument transformers
were modelled as ideal components in the past. Models, that are available in recently
published literature, accurately capture phenomena that may lead to signal distor-
tions. However, the scope of this approach does not include impact of mentioned
phenomena on performance of protective devices.
Second approach, evaluation of protection performance, is based on testing pro-
tective devices, in order to verify their correct operation for different power system
conditions. Testing procedures usually focus on determining selectivity and opera-
tional time for various different disturbances and faults [21], [10], [13]. This approach
does not address impact of signal distortions.
This thesis will propose a different approach to study the problem. The new ap-
proach can be regarded as synthesis of the mentioned two approaches. It assumes an
evaluation of influence of instrument transformers on protection system performance
by combining results from the mentioned two approaches into a systematic method-
ology. To better appreciate the new approach, thesis objectives will be discussed
next.
4D. Thesis Objectives
Objectives of the thesis are:
1. Development of a new methodology for evaluation
2. Implementation of the methodology
3. Methodology application
Steps for reaching the objective are:
• Reviewing instrument transformer designs and characteristics and their impact
on signal distortions
• Analyzing protection system sensitivity to signal distortions
• Defining new and improved criteria and methodology for evaluation of influence
of signal distortions on protection system
• Implementing methodology through modelling and simulation
• Applying methodology using simulation environment
E. Thesis Contribution
This thesis makes both theoretical and practical contribution toward the problem
solution. Theoretical contribution is a new methodology for evaluation of influence
of instrument transformers, as discussed in the previous section. The new evaluation
methodology alleviates shortcomings of existing practices. It provides answers to the
following questions:
• Why the evaluation of influence of instrument transformers on protection system
performance is necessary and important ?
5• How the influence of instrument transformers performance can be identified ?
• What are the means for quantifying (measuring) the influence ?
• What is the best procedure for coming up with quantitative measure of the
influence ?
• What is the meaning of the quantitative measures ?
Practical aspect of the contribution is the development of the simulation envi-
ronment for automated and comprehensive evaluation of the mentioned influence.
The environment improves the existing evaluation practices. It allows one to derive
quantitative measures of the influence indicators. Finally, it will be shown how the
quantitative measures can be interpreted.
F. Conclusion
This thesis explores influence of instrument transformers on the power system protec-
tion, analyzes possible consequences and demonstrates how a new methodology can
enhance existing evaluation practices. The new methodology for evaluation is defined
to have the main objectives of emphasizing why the evaluation is necessary, what
procedures should be applied and how to interpret the outcome of the evaluation.
The conclusion from studying the present status of the existing solutions is that
there is a lot of room for improvement. The improvement need is facilitated by emerg-
ing novel instrument transformer designs (such as optical instrument transformers).
The novel designs should be verified for correct supply of current and voltage signal
replicas before being commissioned.
The following approach to the rest of the study in this thesis was defined: first,
characteristics of instrument transformers will be discussed, as well as mechanism of
6their influence on the signal distortions. The protection system may be sensitive to
mentioned distortions. This sensitivity will be investigated next. After the necessity
for evaluation of the influence of distortion has been established, the criteria and
methodology will be defined. A practical way of applying the methodology through
software simulation will be demonstrated next. Results of the simulation will be
presented.
7CHAPTER II
IMPACT OF INSTRUMENT TRANSFORMERS ON SIGNAL DISTORTIONS
A. Introduction
Purpose of instrument transformers is delivery of accurate current and voltage repli-
cas, irrespective of transformer design and characteristics. However, this is not always
achieved with conventional instrument transformers. Deviations of output signals
from the input ones are inherent to conventional instrument transformers, due to
their design and performance characteristics.
This chapter provides theoretical background on various instrument transformer
designs, performance characteristics and their impacts on output signals. Typical
instrument transformer designs will be described first. Next, three most notable
instrument transformer performance characteristics, accuracy, frequency bandwidth
and transient response will be investigated. Their impact on signal distortions will
be discussed. Illustrations of typical signal distortions will be given.
Material presented in this chapter will establish reasons why conventional in-
strument transformers should be improved. The material will also serve as basis for
studying sensitivity of protective devices in Chapter III and for deriving evaluation
criteria in Chapter IV.
B. Typical Instrument Transformer Designs
1. Current Transformers
There are two types of current transformers (CT) available: bushing and wound [1],
[22], as shown in Fig. 1. The core of a bushing transformer is annular, while the
secondary winding is insulated from the core. The secondary winding is permanently
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Fig. 1. Two types of current transformers
assembled on the core. There is no primary winding. The primary winding of wound
transformer consists of several turns that encircle the core. More than one core may
be present. The primary windings and secondary windings are insulated from each
other and from the core. They are assembled as an integral structure.
Bushing transformers have lower accuracy than the wound ones, but they are
less expensive [1]. Because of this favorable low-cost they are very often used with
IEDs performing protection functions. Similarly, because of their great accuracy
with low currents, wound transformers are usually applied in metering and similar
applications. Another benefit of bushing transformers is their convenient placement
in the bushings of power transformers and circuit breakers. This means that they
take up no appreciable space in the substation.
The core of bushing transformers encompasses the conductor carrying the pri-
mary current. Because of such a design, the core presents relatively large path for the
establishment of electromagnetic (EM) field, necessary for the conversion of current.
This is the primary reason for their lower accuracy, when compared with wound trans-
9formers. However, bushing transformers are also built with increased cross-sectional
area of iron in the core. The advantage of this is higher accuracy in scaling of fault
currents that are of large multiples of nominal current, when compared to wound
transformers. High accuracy for high fault currents is desirable in protective relaying.
Therefore, the bushing transformers are a good choice for protective applications.
2. Voltage Transformers
Voltage transformers are available in two types [1]:
1. Electromagnetic voltage transformer (VT)
2. Coupling-capacitor voltage transformer (CCVT)
Voltage transformer is very similar to conventional power transformer. Main differ-
ence is that voltage transformer is connected to a small and constant load. CCVT
has two main designs: 1) the coupling-capacitor device, 2) bushing device. The first
design consists of a series of capacitors (arranged in a stack), where the secondary of
the transformer is taken from the last capacitor in series (called auxiliary capacitor).
The second design uses capacitance bushings to produce secondary voltage at the
output.
In order to better understand the operating principle of a CCVT, equivalent
circuit of a coupling-capacitor transformer is shown in Fig. 2 (ZB presents the trans-
former burden). The equivalent reactance of this circuit can be expressed as:
XL =
XC1 ·XC2
XC1 + XC2
(2.1)
By choosing values for XC1 and XC2, reactance XL can be adjusted. The purpose of
adjusting this reactance is to ensure that primary and the secondary voltages are in
10
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Fig. 2. Equivalent circuit of a CCVT (simplified)
phase (synchronized). Since CCVTs are built in such a way that:
XC1 << XC2 (2.2)
it follows that practically
XL ∼= XC2 (2.3)
Main purpose of coupling-capacitor transformers reduction of the transmission-level
voltage VP (primary side voltage) to a safe metering level VS (secondary side voltage).
However, an electromagnetic transformer is sometimes used in connection with the
CCVT to further reduce the voltage, usually to level of 67 V line-to-neutral (115 V
line-to-line).
C. Accuracy
Accuracy is a characteristic defined only for steady-state input signal, be that normal
or abnormal (faulted) state. There are two accuracy rating classes for instrument
transformers defined in the IEEE standard [22]. This IEEE standard is widely ac-
cepted, by both instrument transformer manufacturers and users. Therefore, it will
be used as basis for discussion of accuracy. Mentioned accuracy classes are:
1. Revenue metering class
11
2. Relaying class
While revenue metering class is defined for both current transformers and voltage
transformers, relaying accuracy class is defined for current transformers only. Both
classes will be discussed, for the sake of completeness. Before discussing the classes,
some additional terms will be defined first. The definitions of terms are based on [22]:
• Transformer correction factor (TCF) is the ratio of the true watts or watt-
hours to the measured secondary watts or watt-hours, divided by the marked
ratio. TCF is equal to the ratio correction factor multiplied by the phase angle
correction factor for a specified primary circuit power factor.
• Ratio correction factor (RCF) is the ratio of the true ratio to the marked ratio.
True ratio is the ratio of the root-mean-square (RMS) primary voltage or current
to the RMS secondary voltage or current under specified conditions.
• Phase angle correction factor (PACF) is the ratio of the true power factor
to the measured power factor. It is a function of both the phase angles of
the instrument transformers and the power factor of the primary circuit being
measured.
The two accuracy classes are discussed in more detail in sections to follow. Discussion
is based on IEEE standard [22].
1. Revenue Metering Accuracy Class
Accuracy classes for metering and relaying application of instrument transformers
differ. Metering usually demands more accurate secondary signals than relaying.
Revenue metering accuracy classes require that the TCF of instrument transformers
shall be within specified limits. This requirement is specified when the power factor
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Table I. Standard burdens, revenue metering accuracy
Designation R [Ω] L [mH] Z [Ω] S [VA] Power Factor
B-0.1 0.09 0.116 0.1 2.5 0.9
B-0.2 0.18 0.232 0.2 5.0 0.9
B-0.5 0.45 0.580 0.5 12.5 0.9
B-0.9 0.81 1.040 0.9 22.5 0.9
B-1.8 1.62 2.080 1.8 45.0 0.9
of load is in the range [0.6, 1.0]. Requirement is valid only under certain conditions,
which are:
• In the case of current transformer, the load is a standard burden (see Table I).
Range of input current magnitudes is [10%, 100%] of rated primary magnitude.
• In the case of voltage transformer, the load is any burden (in [VA]) in range
from zero to the specified standard burden. Range of input voltage magnitudes
is [90%, 110%] of rated primary magnitude.
The limits for TCF for the revenue metering accuracy classes are given in Table II.
2. Relaying Accuracy Class
Relaying accuracy classes put a requirement on the RCF of current transformers:
RCF is not to exceed 10%. Since there are several relaying accuracy classes, they are
Table II. Standard accuracy classes for revenue metering (TCF limits)
CLASS VT CT
100% rated 10% rated
Min Max Min Max Min Max
0.3 0.997 1.003 0.997 1.003 0.994 1.006
0.6 0.994 1.006 0.994 1.006 0.988 1.012
1.2 0.988 1.012 0.988 1.012 0.976 1.024
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Table III. Standard burdens, relaying accuracy
Designation R [Ω] L [mH] Z [Ω] S [VA] Power Factor
B-1 0.50 2.300 1.0 25.0 0.5
B-2 1.00 4.600 2.0 50.0 0.5
B-4 2.00 9.200 4.0 100.0 0.5
B-8 4.00 18.400 8.0 200.0 0.5
designated by a letter and a secondary terminal voltage rating, as follows:
1. Letter C, K, or T. Flux leakage in the core of current transformers, designated
as C and K, does not influence transformer ratio. Additional feature of current
transformer designated K is having a knee-point voltage at least 70% of the
rated secondary voltage magnitude. Current transformer designated as T have
appreciable flux leakage in the core. This leakage deteriorates transformer ratio
significantly.
2. Secondary terminal voltage rating. This voltage is a maximum voltage, pro-
duced by a standard burden and input current of magnitude 20 times the rated
one, that will still keep the transformer ratio from exceeding 10 % of RCF.
Standard burdens are given in Tables I and III. Rated secondary terminal voltages,
associated with standard burdens, are given in Table IV.
Table IV. Secondary terminal voltages and associated standard burdens
Voltage [V] 10 20 50 100 200 400 800
Burden B-0.1 B-0.2 B-0.5 B-1 B-2 B-4 B-8
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D. Frequency Response
Frequency response can be evaluated only for linear systems. In general, instrument
transformers are not linear devices. However, instrument transformers are usually
properly sized (with parameters of various components) to operate only in linear
region. This means that most of the time, instrument transformers can be regarded
as linear devices. Frequency response in such cases is discussed in following sections.
1. Current Transformers
Magnitude of the frequency response of a typical current transformer is constant over
a very wide frequency range (up to 50 kHz) [7]. The phase angle is also constant
and has zero value. For practical purposes current transformer can be regarded as
having no impact on the spectral content of the input signal, under condition that
electromagnetic flux in the core is in the linear region. In case the flux goes out of
the linear region, transformers are no longer considered linear devices, which means
that frequency response cannot be evaluated. This situation is discussed in section E
of this chapter.
2. Voltage Transformers
Similarly as in the case of current transformers, frequency response of voltage trans-
formers and CCVTs can be evaluated only when the magnetic flux in the core is in the
linear region. Cases of flux being in the non-linear region are discussed in Section E
of this chapter.
Typical frequency range of signals used by IEDs is up to 10 kHz. In this range,
voltage transformer frequency response acts as a low-pass filter. The cut-off frequency
depends on the parameters of voltage transformer. Most notable parameters (that
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Fig. 3. Stray capacitances in a voltage transformer
influence cut-off frequency) are:
1. Stray capacitances associated with primary and secondary winding (C1 and C2,
respectively)
2. Stray capacitance between primary and secondary windings (C12).
Stray capacitances C1, C2, C12 are shown in Fig. 3, where VP is the primary side
voltage (transmission line side), VS is secondary side voltage (IED side).
Frequency response of a typical voltage transformer can be studied using models
and simulation software, such as Alternative Transient Program (ATP) [23]. The
mentioned software (discussed more in chapters to come) offers frequency analysis
of the models. Special benefit of using ATP is graphical user interface, available in
the form of (separate) program ATPDraw. A typical ATP implementation (through
ATPDraw) of a VT model is shown in Fig. 4. In the figure, generator is modelled
as AC type source. Transformer is modelled as a single-phase saturable transformer.
Resistors are set to value of 1 Ω, while label “V” denotes voltage probe element (volt-
meter). The frequency of a typical voltage transformer obtained using the mentioned
model is shown in Fig. 5. ATP can also be used for evaluation of influence of voltage
transformer parameters on frequency response. The same simulation approach (as the
one shown in Fig. 4) can be used for evaluation. However, such evaluation is beyond
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Fig. 4. Evaluation of the voltage transformer frequency response
the scope of this thesis. More on experimental evaluation of frequency response of
voltage transformers can be found in reference [7].
CCVT frequency response also shows fluctuations. Most notable sources of this
frequency dependability are the same as with voltage transformers. As in the case of
voltage transformers, frequency response of CCVTs can be evaluated using ATP. ATP
implementation (through ATPDraw) shown in Fig. 6 can be used for the evaluation.
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Fig. 5. Frequency response of a voltage transformer in the linear region
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Fig. 6. Evaluation of the CCVT frequency response
In Fig. 6 various labels denote respective nodes, while value of the components (such
as resistors, capacitors, etc.) are discussed in more details in Chapter V. Typical
frequency response is shown in Fig. 7. More on experimental evaluation of frequency
response of CCVTs can be found in reference [9].
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Fig. 7. Frequency response of a CCVT in the linear region
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E. Transient Response
1. Current Transformers
Saturation of the electromagnetic core is the single factor that influences the current
transformer transient response the most [2], [5]. It is caused by non-linear nature of
the electromagnetic core of the current transformer. Saturation can lead to severe
signal distortions in the current transformer output. Distortion occurs whenever the
core flux density enters the region of saturation. This region can be represented
using V-I characteristic of the core. A typical V-I characteristic is shown in Fig. 8.
This characteristic presents dependence of exciting voltage VE on the exciting current
IE [22]. This dependence is actually the input-output characteristic of a non-linear
inductor, that can be used to model the electromagnetic core. The simplified model
of the core is shown in Fig. 9.
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Fig. 8. V-I characteristic of the electromagnetic core
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Typical power system conditions that can initiate current transformer satura-
tion include excessive fault currents and lower magnitude asymmetrical (offset) fault
currents. Major factors that affect density of the core flux are [5]:
• Physical parameters of the current transformer (transformer ratio, saturation
curve, etc.)
• Magnitude, duration and shape of the primary current signal
• Magnitude and nature (active, reactive) of the secondary burden
The fault current with maximum DC offset is shown in Fig. 10. When a current
transformer is exposed to this current on its input, it will induce core flux density as
shown in Fig. 10 (assuming resistive burden, without loss of generality).
There are two components of the total flux Φ. Alternating flux ΦAC is the flux
induced by the fundamental frequency component of the fault current. Transient flux
ΦDC is the flux induced by the DC component of the fault current. The variation
of the transient flux ΦDC is a function of time constants, of both the primary and
the secondary circuit. The primary circuit constant is defined by the power network
section, to which the current transformer is connected. The secondary circuit time
constant is defined by:
Ideal transformer Electromagnetic core
Primary side Secondary sideVS IE
Fig. 9. Model of the transformer electromagnetic core (simplified)
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1. Current transformer secondary leakage impedance
2. Current transformer secondary winding impedance
3. Burden impedance
The current transformer secondary leakage impedance can usually be neglected and
the current transformer secondary winding impedance is usually combined with the
burden impedance to form the total burden.
The dependence of the level of the saturation on the total burden is shown in
Fig. 11. The figure presents comparison between the secondary (marked 1 in the
figure) and the primary (referred to the secondary, marked 2) current of a 900:5
current transformer subjected to a fully offset current of 16200 A (18 times the rated
value). Burden in the first case (upper diagram) is ZB1 = 1.33 + j0.175Ω, while in
the second case (lower diagram), the burden is ZB2 = 8.33 + j0.175Ω. These two
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Fig. 11. Secondary current and primary scaled to secondary during a fault
burdens correspond to effect of standard burdens B-1 and B-8 (see Table III).
It can be seen in Fig. 11 that distortion begins certain amount of time after the
fault inception. The notion of the time-to-saturation is introduced as a measure of
the mentioned amount of time [5]. Time-to-saturation is defined as the time period,
starting after the fault inception, during which the secondary current is a faithful
replica of the primary current. Time-to-saturation can be determined analytically,
given power system parameters. A more practical approach is to generate a set of
generalized curves, that can be used for direct reading of time-to-saturation. A set of
such curves can be found in [5]. Time-to-saturation is easily read from the mentioned
curves by choosing the proper curve, based on the saturation factor Ks. This factor
can be calculated as:
Ks =
VxN2
I1R2
=
ωT1T2
T1 − T2
(
e
− t
T2 − e
− t
T1
)
+ 1 (2.4)
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where Vx is RMS saturation voltage, N2 is the number of the secondary windings,
I1 is the primary current magnitude, R2 is the resistance of total secondary burden
(winding plus external resistance), ω is 2pi · 60 rad.
2. Voltage Transformers
There are two power system conditions that can cause problematic response of voltage
transformers. The conditions are [9]:
1. Sudden decrease of voltage at the transformer terminals (due to e.g. a fault
close to voltage transformer)
2. Sudden overvoltages (on the sound phases due to e.g. line-to-ground faults
elsewhere in the power network)
First type of condition can produce internal oscillations within the electromag-
netic core of electromagnetic voltage transformers. They appear on the secondary
winding output in the form of high-frequency oscillations (frequency much higher
than the system frequency, sometimes called ringing). The damping time of such
oscillations is usually between 15 and 20 ms. In case of CCVTs, oscillations at the
secondary winding, caused by the energy stored in the capacitive and inductive ele-
ments of the device, can last up to 100 ms. Second type of power system condition
can lead to saturation of the electromagnetic core. The mechanism and effect of the
saturation of the core is the same as with current transformers (which was already
discussed).
The mentioned oscillations are commonly referred to as the subsidence transient.
The subsidence transient generated by CCVTs is studied in reference [6]. In the study,
subsidence transient is defined as an error voltage appearing at the output terminals
of a coupling-capacitor voltage transformer resulting from a sudden and significant
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Fig. 12. Examples of a CCVT subsidence transient
drop in the primary voltage. The transient can be classified as belonging to one of
the three classes:
1. Unidirectional
2. Oscillatory, foscillation > 60Hz
3. Oscillatory, foscillation < 60Hz
Examples of subsidence transients are shown in Fig. 12. Figure shows secondary
voltage of a 345 kV CCVT after voltage collapse (e.g. due to a phase-to-ground fault,
close to the bus containing the voltage transformer). Transients are marked 1 and 2
in the figure. Burden in case of transient 1 is ZB1 = 100Ω (resistive), while transient 2
is caused by burden ZB2 = j100Ω (inductive). The transient starts at approximately
80 ms (see Fig. 12).
The factors that influence the subsidence transient the most are:
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1. Coupling-capacitor voltage transformer burden
2. Coupling-capacitor voltage transformer design
3. Ferroresonance suppression circuit (FSC)
The influence of FSC on transient response of voltage transformers will be explained
in the text to follow. Experimental evaluation shows that elements of the coupling-
capacitor voltage transformer burden, that influence the subsidence transient, are
[6]:
1. Burden magnitude. The influence of the burden is lessened when the magnitude
of the used burden is smaller than the nominal one.
2. Burden power factor. Decrease in the power factor leads to lessening of the
subsidence transient.
3. Composition and connection of the burden. If there are inductive elements
present in the CCVT that have a high Q factor, the subsidence transient be-
comes great. However, the subsidence can be lessened by using series RL burden.
The subsidence transient is affected by surge capacitors in a minor way.
Coupling-capacitor voltage transformers may also contain a ferroresonance sup-
pression circuit (FSC) connected on the secondary side [24]. Due to their design,
FSC may impact CCVT transient response in certain cases. FSC designs, accord-
ing to their status during the transformer operation, can be divided into two main
operational modes:
• Active mode. This mode is achieved by connecting capacitors and iron core
inductors in parallel, at the secondary. The mentioned elements are tuned to
25
the fundamental frequency. Usually, such a construction is permanently placed
on the secondary side.
• Passive mode. This mode of operation is achieved by connecting only a resistor
at the secondary. Optionally, a gap or an electronic circuit can be placed in
series with the resistor. These elements are activated whenever an over voltage
occurs. Such a configuration has no effect on the voltage transformer transient
response in case there is no overvoltage.
F. Conclusion
This chapter reviewed typical instrument transformer designs, their characteristics
and their impacts on signals distortions. Typical current transformer designs - bush-
ing and wound, as well as typical VT/CCVT designs were described from the stand-
point of protection system. Advantages and disadvantages of some designs over other
designs were addressed.
Three most notable instrument transformer characteristics - accuracy, frequency
response and transient response, were investigated. It was shown that all three charac-
teristics can lead to distortions. Main source of distortions with current transformers
is the saturation. Main source of distortions with VTs/CCVTs is the subsidence
transient and ferroresonance. Causes and mechanisms of mentioned distortions were
discussed. Means of lessening their impact were also addressed.
The conclusion is that impact of instrument transformer designs and charac-
teristics on distortions may be significant. When the power system conditions are
adequate, output signal can be significantly different from the scaled-down version
of input signal. This presents motivation to investigate influence of distortions on
protective devices. This issue is addressed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III
PROTECTION SYSTEM SENSITIVITY TO SIGNAL DISTORTIONS
A. Introduction
Algorithms inside protective devices are designed to achieve maximum selectivity and
minimum operational time for fault waveforms as inputs. Algorithm performance in
case of artificial deviations from such input signals is hard to predict. Depending on
type and extent of deviation, protective devices might be “fooled” into making wrong
decisions, such as unnecessarily isolating network sections, or failing to disconnect
faulted component.
This chapter analyzes sensitivity of protection system to artificial distortions in
current and voltage signals on input. Core of protection system are IEDs - Intelligent
Electronic Devices. Their elements and functions are described first. Next, the men-
tioned sensitivity is established using a simple test method. Finally, negative impacts
of distortions are investigated. Material in this chapter demonstrates the necessity
for evaluation of influence of signal distortions.
B. Elements and Functions of the Power System Protection
Functions of modern protection systems are performed by IEDs. Typical elements of
IEDs are shown in Fig. 13. The elements are arranged to make measurements and
decision regarding interpretation of observed variables (current, voltages, power flow,
etc.), as well as take action as required.
Elements in Fig. 13 may be complex, consisting of sub-elements. Data acquisition
block is the front end that performs filtering, sampling and digitalization of the analog
input current and/or voltage signals. Measuring block extracts desired quantities,
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such as current and voltage phasors, impedance, power, etc. Signal processing and
decision making block relies on basic operating principles to derive trip, alarm, control
or data signal. The flowchart of the decision making block is shown in Fig. 14.
Decision making element constantly compares the measured quantities, or some
combination of them, against a threshold setting that is computed by the protection
engineer and is entered into the IED. If this comparison indicates an alert condition, a
decision element is triggered. This may involve a timing element or some other checks
on signals coming from other relays. Finally, if all the checks lead to a conclusion that
there is a fault, an action element is enabled to operate. This operation is the actual
execution of a trip by a protection function. Basic protections functions include:
• Overcurrent protection: A function that operates when its input (current) ex-
ceeds a predetermined value
Metered
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Element Action Element
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Quantity
Fig. 14. Flowchart of the decision making block
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• Directional protection: A function that picks up for faults in one direction, and
is restrained for faults in the other direction
• Differential protection: A function that is intended to respond to a difference be-
tween incoming and outgoing electrical quantities associated with the protected
apparatus
• Distance protection: A function used for protection of transmission lines whose
response to the input quantities is primarily a function of the electrical distance
between the relay location and the fault point
• Pilot protection: A function that is a form of the transmission line protection
that uses a communication channel as the means of comparing relay actions at
the line terminals
C. Types of Signal Distortions
Possible conditions of a power system can be divided in two general categories:
1. Normal condition
2. Abnormal (faulted) condition
Power systems often carry signals that are corrupted in one way of another,
irrespective of the condition. Dominant distortions in normal condition are power
quality (PQ) disturbances. There are several different definitions of PQ disturbances
in the literature [25].
Distortions that are dominant in abnormal (faulted) condition are transients.
Transient are phenomena caused by power system’s inability to instantaneously trans-
fer energy, due to presence of energy-storing components, such as inductor and ca-
pacitor banks.
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This thesis will address protection system sensitivity only to signals belonging
to the second category, abnormal (faulted) condition.
Field application has shown that instrument transformers do not cause signifi-
cant signal distortions during normal power condition, while they may induce severe
distortions during abnormal conditions (see Chapter II). General explanation for such
a performance is as follows:
• Instrument transformers are designed with normal conditions in mind. This
means that components of the design (such as electromagnetic core, various ca-
pacitors, inductors, etc.) are chosen to operate in linear regions, when exposed
to signals up to certain magnitudes (component ratings). Disturbances in nor-
mal operation do not cause these elements to leave linear region of operation
[5], [6], [8], [9]. In order to properly size (select) mentioned transformer com-
ponents, study has to be performed, to calculate maximum operating current
under all expected disturbances, such as harmonic components, power quality
events, and similar.
• During abnormal (faulted) conditions, current and voltage magnitudes can
change rapidly (within fractions of a 60 Hz cycle), in the range of thousands of
volts and amperes. If the change of signal magnitudes is sufficient (in current
power systems it often is), instrument transformers will be moved out of linear
region of operation.
D. Protection Function Sensitivity to Signal Distortions
A simple method can be used to establish IED sensitivity to input signal distortions.
The method proposed here covers typical distortions caused by instrument transform-
ers (see Chapter II). However, any kind of distortion can be evaluated for impact on
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IEDs.
The method can be summarized as follows: IED sensitivity can be checked by
comparing IED response (output) when exposed to different levels of distortions in
the same input signal. This approach can be found in literature [26], [27].
The method can be illustrated by sensitivity of overcurrent protection IED to
current transformer saturation. A simple simulation was carried out on models of
current transformers and IEDs. Results are shown in Fig. 15. In order to gener-
ate signals with different levels of saturation, two current transformer models were
used for scaling-down of primary side signals. Difference between models is the V-I
characteristic of the electromagnetic core. The two characteristics are discussed in
Chapter V. IED input signals produced by the two current transformers (shown in
Fig. 15) show different levels of distortion. Output signals of IED models show the
same response for both input signals. However, when burden of the second current
transformer was increased from ZB1 = 1.33 + j0.175Ω to ZB2 = 8.33 + j0.175Ω, IED
model showed significantly different response, also shown in Fig. 15. Conclusion is
that IED model is sensitive to distortion levels above a certain threshold. Questions
that arise from the conclusion are:
1. Are there negative impacts of distortions on IED performance, or can they be
neglected ? (i.e. is IED sensitivity significant enough to cause undesirably low
performance)
2. If there is negative impact, how can it be measured ?
The first question is discussed in the following section. The second question is dealt
with in the next chapter.
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Fig. 15. Examples of the IED sensitivity to input signal distortions
E. Negative Impact of Distortions
1. Impact of Current Transformers
Negative influence of distortions was reported in the literature. There are studies that
investigate the impact of various distortions on different protective functions [26]-[28].
Study [26] investigates some specific applications, when it is expected that current
transformers will saturate during asymmetrical faults (situations such as unplanned
extension of the current transformer wiring cable, which greatly increases its burden).
Most protection devices make operating decisions based on the RMS1 value of fault
current. If the signal supplied by the current transformer is distorted by saturation,
the RMS values calculated by the protection device will be lower than the RMS
values of the actual fault current. In the case of overcurrent protection, this can
1RMS: Root Mean Square
32
cause protection device to trip with undesired delay.
In order to verify these results, simulation was performed using models of a sat-
urable current transformer and an overcurrent protection relay (details of the men-
tioned models can be found in references [9], [29]). Simulation was carried out to
evaluate impact of current transformer saturation. A phase-A-to-ground (AG) fault
was simulated at 10% of the transmission line length at 0.05 s. The phase A fault
current (including a portion of the pre-fault steady state) is shown in Fig. 16. The
dotted line represents the primary current scaled to secondary, while the full line
represents the secondary current, which is supplied to the relay model. Fig. 16 also
shows the trip signal derived by the relay model (dotted line presents trip signal for
the undistorted input signal, while the full line presents trip signal for input distorted
by saturation). Fig. 16 shows delayed tripping (more than one 60 Hz cycle). The
delay is long enough that it may present threat to safe operation of the entire power
system.
Work presented in reference [30] addresses impact of current transformers on the
distance protection. The results show that when the current transformer undergoes
distortion, the measuring algorithm detects the fundamental frequency component of
the fault current with a lower value than the actual. This kind of distortion can make
the calculated impedance trajectory to enter and exit the zone of protection before
the trip signal is asserted, or the calculated trajectory may not enter the zone of
protection during the first cycle in which the fault occurred. Therefore, the effect of
the current transformer saturation can cause a delay in issuing a trip signal. It should
be noted that if the current transformer undergoes saturation by the symmetrical fault
current (i.e. when the exponential decay component is zero) the impedance trajectory
calculated by the measuring algorithm may never enter the zone of protection.
To verify the results from [30] simulation was performed using models of a sat-
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Fig. 16. Input current and the relay model response for a simulated fault
urable current transformer, a saturable CCVT and a distance protection relay (details
of the mentioned models can be found in references [9], [29]). Simulation was car-
ried out to evaluate impact of current transformer saturation. A phase-A-to-ground
(AG) fault was simulated at 75% of the transmission line length. The reach of the
zone 1 protection was set at 80% of the line length, while the reach of the zone 2
was set at 120% of the transmission line length. The R-X impedance plane is suit-
able for visualizing the calculation of the fault impedance by the relay model. R-X
impedance plane is organized by a two-axis coordinate system, where abscissa repre-
sents real part of the impedance, i.e. <{Z} and ordinate represents imaginary part
of the impedance, i.e. ={Z}. Fault impedance trajectories are shown in R-X plane in
Fig. 17. Fig. 17 contains trajectories calculated from undistorted and distorted input
current and voltage signals, where numbers 3 through 8 represent sample instances
after the fault inception (impedance is calculated for every sample of input current
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Fig. 17. Fault impedance trajectories (CT impact evaluation)
and voltage signals). In this illustration, the measuring algorithm has sampling rate
of eight samples per cycle, and has sampling resolution of sixteen bits (every sample is
presented as sixteen-bit number). The undistorted input signals are shown in Fig. 18,
while distorted input signals are shown in Fig. 19. Differences between undistorted
and distorted input current signals, ∆IA, ∆IB, ∆IC , are shown in Fig. 20, to better
display the distortions.
Fig. 17 shows that fault was identified within zone 1 during the first 60 Hz cycle
after the fault inception for undistorted input signals, while the relay model miss-
operated by detecting a fault in zone 2, and asserted only an intentionally-delayed
trip signal (relay acted only as a backup protection) for distorted input signals. The
relay model response in this case was unexpected. Such behavior clearly demonstrates
negative impact of distortions caused by current transformers.
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Fig. 18. Undistorted input signals (CT impact evaluation)
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Fig. 19. Distorted input signals (CT impact evaluation)
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2. Impact of Voltage Transformers/CCVTs
Studies [27] and [28] examine impact of voltage transformer and CCVT on the dis-
tance protection. The results are showing that error, generated by the voltage trans-
formers, is often large, compared with the primary signal (being measured) and with
the sensitivity of connected IEDs. In the case of a distortion, the IED performance
may be degraded and one-cycle operation may not be possible any more.
To verify results from [27] and [28], simulation was performed using models of
a saturable current transformer, a saturable CCVT and a distance protection relay
(details of the mentioned models can be found in references [9], [29]). Simulation
was carried out to evaluate impact of voltage transformer saturation and subsidence
transient. A phase-B-to-phase-C fault was simulated at 85% of the transmission line
length. The reach of the zone 1 protection was set at 80% of the line length, while the
reach of the zone 2 was set at 120% of the transmission line length. Fault impedance
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trajectories are shown in Fig. 21. Fig. 21 contains trajectories calculated from undis-
torted and distorted input current and voltage signals, where numbers 5 through 11
represent sample instances after the fault inception (impedance is calculated for ev-
ery sample of input current and voltage signals). In this illustration, the measuring
algorithm has sampling rate of eight samples per cycles, and has sampling resolution
of sixteen bits (every sample is presented as sixteen-bit number).
As can be seen, the trajectory indicates fault impedance within zone 2 for in-
stances 5,6,7,8. Fault impedance for instances 9,10,11 is in a critical vicinity of the
border line between zones 1 and 2. This critical vicinity is showed in more detail in
Fig. 22. Fig. 22 shows that fault impedance enters zone 1 only during one instance for
undistorted input signals, while the fault impedance remains in zone 1 during two in-
stances for distorted input signals. This additional instance of fault impedance being
in zone 1 is caused by CCVT-induced distortion. The relay model correctly operated
when supplied with undistorted input signals (relay model intentionally delayed trip
assertion). The relay model miss-operated when supplied with distorted input sig-
nals (relay model immediately asserted trip, as if the fault impedance was in zone
1). Undistorted input signals are shown in Fig. 23, while distorted input signals are
shown in Fig. 24. Since it is virtually impossible to identify the difference between the
Figs. 23 and 24, differences between undistorted and distorted input voltage signals
∆VA, ∆VB, ∆VC are shown in Fig. 25.
The difference between trajectories shown in Fig. 22 shows that IED models can
be very sensitive to input signal distortions. This kind of sensitivity is dependent on
the design of the protective IEDs. The distance relaying algorithm involves counters
which monitor the number of calculation iterations for which the impedance remains
within a certain zone of protection. Depending on the threshold settings of the
counters, protection may or may not be sensitive to certain input signal distortions.
38
−60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
 5 6
 7
 8
 91011
Zone 1
Zone 2
Trajectory for undistorted input signals
−60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
 5 6
 7
 8
 91011
Zone 1
Zone 2
Trajectory for distorted input signals
Fig. 21. Fault impedance trajectories (VT impact evaluation)
0 5 10 15
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
 9
10
11
Zone 1
Zone 2
Trajectory for undistorted input signals
0 5 10 15
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
 9
10
11
Zone 1
Zone 2
Trajectory for distorted input signals
Fig. 22. Enlarged portions of fault impedance trajectories (VT impact evaluation)
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F. Cause of Protection Sensitivity to Signal Distortions
Test cases from the previous section have shown that even the small changes in input
current and voltage signals can lead to misoperation of protective relays. The cause
of this sensitivity of protection relays is the nature of response of protective relays to
input signals.
Studies of performance evaluation of the protection system have shown that the
procedure for derivation of the trip signal for steady-state input signals is determin-
istic, while for transient input signals the the procedure is stochastic [13], [14], [15],
[16]. An illustration of this stochastic nature is the analysis presented in reference
[13]. Trip decision is based on a certain parameter (derived from input current and
voltage signals), which can be denoted as Z(t). The mentioned parameter has the
value Zprefault during the steady-state preceding the fault inception, and it has the
value Zpostfault during steady-state following the fault inception (the two mentioned
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steady-state periods are separated by a transient period). During the transient period
associated with the fault, the discrete-time representation of the parameter Z(t) can
be written as:
Z(n) = Zprefault + S(n) (3.1)
where n is index of a time point, S(n) is the error of the estimated value. Ideally
S(n) = 0 for every n. Since ideal conditions are hardly met in practical application
of relays, it is necessary to minimize discrete signal S(n). One of the minimization
techniques commonly used is minimum square error minimization. The objective of
this technique is to find min(E{S2(n)}) under the constraint E{S(n)} = 0, where
E{x} denotes expected value of the ensemble of signals. In practice, this technique
is applied through simulation of many test cases and subsequent statistical analysis
of signals Z(n). The time-average value ZNk of the signal Z(n) during the test case
number k can be expressed as:
ZNk =
1
N
N∑
n=1
Z(n) (3.2)
where N is the number of time-points during which the time-average is calculated.
For total number K of test cases, mean value M of signals Z(n) can be expressed as:
M =
1
K
K∑
k=1
ZNk (3.3)
In case there was no estimation error, the condition E{M − Zpostfault} = 0 would be
valid. Since this situation is hardly a case in practical application of relays, index R
can be used as a measure of the randomness of response of protective relays:
R = |M − Zpostfault| (3.4)
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G. Conclusion
The material covered in this chapter explained the sensitivity of the protection system
to signal distortions. First, basic elements and functions of the protection system
were described. It was shown that protection system is complex, both in elements
and functions. A simple method was used to demonstrate sensitivity of IEDs to
distortions. Since sensitivity varies depending on the amount of distortion, possible
negative impacts were discussed and illustrated. The primary cause of sensitivity of
protection system to input signal distortions was explained (random nature of the
protection system response).
The conclusion of the chapter is that protection system is sensitive to signal dis-
tortions. This sensitivity is not negligible. It was shown that signal distortion may
lead to protection misoperation, such as delayed trips and failures to trip. There-
fore, methodology for evaluation of the mentioned influence is necessary, in order to
correctly identify all situations that could lead to unacceptable protection response.
This conclusion presents incentive for development of a methodology for the
mentioned evaluation. This methodology, as well as associated criteria, is dealt with
in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
EVALUATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF SIGNAL DISTORTIONS
A. Introduction
Evaluation of relay performance is necessary in order to properly identify all the
situations when protection system may miss-operate, operate with unacceptably low
selectivity or unacceptably long operational time. This identification can help prevent
possible future misoperations. Other benefits of the mentioned evaluation include
overall improvement of protection schemes.
This chapter defines a set of criteria that can be used for numerical evaluation
of the protection system performance. Numerical evaluation means that criteria is
expressed quantitatively. Measuring and decision making algorithm are separate el-
ements of protection IEDs (see Chapter III). Therefore, criteria for the mentioned
algorithms is defined separately.
A new methodology for evaluation is also defined in this chapter. The definition
is summarized by answers to several crucial questions. Main contribution of the new
methodology is the combined approach to the evaluation. Currently, methodologies
for performance evaluation of instrument transformers and the protection system
exist. The new methodology, presented here, combines the mentioned two types
of methodologies, to evaluate the impact of instrument transformers on protection
system performance.
B. Shortcomings of the Existing Performance Criteria
Currently, there are many informal criteria that categorize the response of protection
IEDs. A typical criteria (that can be found in literature) classifies the protection
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operation in the following classes [2]:
1. Correct
• As planned
• Not as planned or expected
2. Incorrect, either failure to trip or false tripping
• Not as planned or wanted
• Acceptable for the particular situation
3. No conclusion
Even though such a performance characterization can be useful, it suffers from certain
shortcomings:
• The classes are too broad in certain situations. For example, performances
of two protection devices that both properly detected a fault, but operated
with different time delays, can both be classified as correct. The are no means
within the mentioned class to indicated the difference in performance between
the two devices. Field experience has showed that such difference may cause
miss-coordination of the protection scheme [26].
• Classes are defined using intuitive terms, such as “planned” or “wanted”. De-
pending on the circumstances, these terms may vary greatly (e.g. “as planned”
operation may encompass a broad range of correct operations, where some of
these correct operations may be bordering with incorrect operations, as in the
case of overcurrent protection exposed to low-current faults that produce very
long operational time). Also, in certain situations it may prove hard to clearly
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state limits between the terms. An example of such a situation is when a dis-
tance protection IED clears a fault near the end of zone 1, with unplanned time
delay close to planned time delay for faults in zone 2.
• The classification does not give any information about the reasons why the pro-
tection system operated in a certain manner. This brings out the fact that such
a scale is focused primarily on the link between the cause (fault, disturbance,
etc.) and the effect (protection system response), without taking into account
the processes taking places during the derivation of the protection response.
The above shortcomings make the mentioned performance criteria a poor choice for
evaluation of the influence of signal distortions on protection system performance.
In order to evaluate this influence accurately, a new evaluation criteria needs to be
defined, that will alleviate the mentioned shortcomings.
C. Criteria Based on the Measuring Algorithm
1. Time Response
Measuring algorithm traces a specific feature of the input signal (e.g. amplitude of a
sinusoidal waveform) [16]. That specific feature is called the measured value. Mea-
sured value is usually constant during the steady-state. However, transient periods
of the input signal cause significant fluctuations in the measured value within very
small time-intervals. Fluctuations can be illustrated by time response of a measuring
algorithm. Typical time response of a measuring algorithm is shown in Fig. 26. This
time response represents amplitude of a fault current signal (phase-to-ground fault),
where fault (event) occurs at 0.05 s.
Objective of the measuring algorithm is to capture all measured value fluctuations
with best possible accuracy. Performance indices can evaluate to what extent is this
46
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
y
a
y
max
y
∞
t1max
t2%
Time [s]
M
ea
su
re
d 
va
lu
ed
y0
Fig. 26. Parameters of the generalized measuring algorithm time response
objective achieved. Definitions of indices (used in this thesis) are based on reference
[16]. The following indices are defined as:
• Settling time, t2%, is a time in which the measured value reaches its steady state
with the accuracy of 2% after the inception of the event. The limit accuracy
can in certain cases be extended to 5%.
• Time to the first maximum, t1max, is a time in which the measured value reaches
its maximum value for the first time after the inception of the event.
• Overshoot, ∆y%, is defined as:
∆y% =
ymax − y∞
y∞
(4.1)
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• Normalized error index, enorm, is defined as:
enorm =
1
M · (y∞ − y0)
L+M∑
k=L
(
y(k) − ya
)
(4.2)
Index enorm is computed in the window of M samples starting from the L-th sample.
The reasons for the use of M-sample window is that some decision making algorithms
use transient monitors to postpone derivation of the output signal. This is reflected
in the choice of the value of L. When transient monitor is used, performance of the
measuring algorithm is of interest only after the transient period has passed. In case
the influence of the transient monitor needs to be neglected, L should be set to 1.
2. Frequency Response
Measuring algorithms in protective IEDs are designed to estimate a feature of a
harmonic component at specified frequency. In the United States, the frequency har-
monic is 60 Hz (in Europe, it is 50 Hz). To be able to correctly identify the mentioned
harmonic, other frequencies components should be suppressed during measurement.
However, small variations of specified frequency (60 Hz) are possible in power systems.
Because of this, measuring algorithms usually act as narrow band-pass filters.
Spectral content of a signal, with amplitude shown in Fig. 26, is given in Fig. 27.
Figure contains a portion of the spectrum around 60 Hz (since this is the frequency
of interest). This spectral content Yactual is the frequency response of the actual
measuring algorithm. Performance indices, that measure how much this response is
different from the ideal (band-pass filter) response Yideal can be defined. Definitions
of indices (used in this thesis) are based on reference [16]. The following indices are
defined:
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Fig. 27. Frequency response of the actual and the ideal measuring algorithm
• Gain for DC component, FRDC , is defined as:
FRDC =
Yactual(0)
Yactual(60)
(4.3)
• Aggregated index F , is defined as:
F =
1
f2 − f1
∫ f2
f1
|Yideal(f)− Yactual(f)| df (4.4)
Even thought indices for time and frequency response are based on reference [16],
contribution of this thesis lies in software implementation of those indices and their
subsequent use for evaluation of influence of instrument transformers (while in refer-
ence [16] their use is confined to evaluation of relay performance).
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D. Criteria Based on the Decision Making Algorithm
Decision making algorithm is supplied with the measured signals by the measuring
algorithm. By processing the measured signals, decision making algorithm derives the
final output. Final output may take one of the several forms. Examples are trip signal
(binary signal), fault location (numerical value) and power measurement (continuous
or discrete real signal). Based on the context of the output signal, evaluation criteria
for the decision making algorithm can be defined. The definitions developed in refer-
ences [14], [15] are the good starting point. Extending those definitions, reference [16]
proposes a more compact form of the decision making algorithm performance index:
J = C · P0 + (1− C) · P1 + A · ttrip (4.5)
where C is an arbitrary factor defining the relative importance of the missing opera-
tions and false trippings, A is an arbitrary scaling factor defining the importance of
fast reaction time, P0,P1 are percentages of false trippings and missing operations,
respectively [14], [15], ttrip is the average tripping time. The lower the index J , the
better the relay performance. In this thesis, a different relay performance index is
defined and used:
• Selectivity, s, defined as:
s =
N1 + N0
N
(4.6)
where N1 denotes number of correct trip signals issued, N0 denotes number of
correct trip restraints and N is the total number of exposures. In ideal case
N = N1 + N0.
• Average tripping time, t, defined as time between fault inception and issuing of
trip signal.
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E. Calculation of Performance Indices
While performance indices, defined in previous sections, may seem simple, their cal-
culation, based on realistic signals, can be quite involved. One major issue that
needs to be investigated further is the overshoot. Definition supplied in section C is
valid for any input signal. However, implementation of that definition needs further
clarification.
Depending on the input signal, measured value may have different shapes. Four
shapes that are often found in signals from power networks are shown in Fig. 28.
These four shapes are useful in illustrating calculation of the overshoot. In the figure,
abscissa presents time (in [s]), while time-points where an event occurs (that leads
to change of measured value) are marked with a vertical dashed line. As can be
seen, measured values in Figs. 28(a) and (b) actually do not show any overshoot. In
Figs. 28(c) and (d) the overshoot is present. The two overshoots differ significantly,
though. In figure (c) the overshoot is result of a drop of measured value from pre-event
value to post-event value. The overshoot is negative. In figure (d) the overshoot re-
sults from a rise of the measured value. This leads to a positive overshoot. Because of
this overshoot behavior, it is necessary to have the means to differ between overshoot
types (when calculating performance indices). Simple way of differentiating between
the overshoots is to compare the pre-event and post-event measured values. In the
case the pre-event is greater than the post-event value, the overshoot is found as the
minimum of the measured value, after the event occurrence. If the pre-event value is
smaller than the post-event, the overshoot is found as the maximum of the measured
value, again, after event occurrence. Another issue is the fluctuation of steady-state
value. After the 2% setting time, measured value (depending on type of measuring
algorithm) often oscillates around certain value. For this reason, parameter yinf (see
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Fig. 26) is derived as the mean of the measured value over time, starting from mo-
ment it enters 2 % accuracy region. This is illustrated in Fig. 29. Diagram on the top
shows the measured value, while Diagram in the bottom contains zoomed portion of
the signal.
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Fig. 28. Different types of overshoot
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F. Referent Instrument Transformer
The above indices (from both time and frequency domain) can be used to evaluate
performance of the measuring algorithm. In order to measure impact of distortions on
the algorithm, indices could be calculated for an algorithm first exposed to (scaled-
down, undistorted) primary signals, and afterwards for an algorithm exposed to a
distorted replica. In practice, this would require having available current and voltage
signals from the primary side of current transformers and voltage transformers. In
vast majority of installed instrument transformers, these signals are extremely hard
to obtain, for one or another reason (unaccessible instrument transformer primary,
high voltage and current magnitudes at the primary, etc.). In order to overcome this
difficulty, a notion of a referent instrument transformer is introduced.
In order to evaluate influence of distortions caused by instrument transformers, a
comparison of the index values is necessary. A difference in values of the performance
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indices between:
1. Measuring algorithm exposed to signals supplied by a referent instrument trans-
former
2. Measuring algorithm exposed to signals supplied by instrument transformer
under investigation
is an indicator of the influence of a particular instrument transformer on the measuring
algorithm performance. The main idea behind this concept is that referent instrument
transformer can be regarded as ideal, and therefore, deliver exact signals from the
primary side. This is, of course, impossible to achieve with realistic transformers.
However, it may not be necessary to demand such high performance from referent
instrument transformer. Referent instrument transformer can be any instrument
transformer which performance has two characteristics:
1. Performance is known, meaning that it has been proven in field application or
laboratory testing as accurate
2. Performance is stable, meaning that it has been proven over some period of
time to be not deteriorating
An example of one such instrument transformer would be novel, optical current trans-
ducer. Its laboratory testing and preliminary field application point toward both
characteristics. The meaning and the interpretation of the difference depends on the
choice of the particular indices used as criteria. It is possible to choose a particular
set of indices to target evaluation of influence of a particular instrument transformer
characteristic. For example, if the influence of the transient response (see Chapter II)
needs to be evaluated, a set of criteria indices may consist of:
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1. Overshoot, ∆y%
2. Time to the first maximum, t1max
Tests can be conducted (by exposing the instrument transformer to various power
system conditions) to calculate the values of the indices. If the saturation occurs, with
the increase of the level of saturation, overshoot is expected to decrease while time to
the first maximum is expected to increase, in comparison with the time response of
the referent instrument transformer. This comparison is illustrated in Fig. 30. This
is an example of how comparison of index values can identify increase of saturation.
The mentioned targeted evaluation can be extended into a methodology, which is
explained next.
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G. Definition of the New Methodology
New methodology for evaluation is intended to improve existing practice. Key ele-
ments of the methodology definition are:
1. Establishing reasons why evaluation is necessary
2. Proposing criteria for evaluation
3. Defining procedure and identifying tools for evaluation
4. Interpretation of evaluation results
The key elements are summarized in the form of questions and answers.
Why is evaluation of influence of instrument transformers on IEDs necessary
and important ? There are two main reasons:
1. Instrument transformers are known to distort signals coming from the primary
side. At present, there is no generally successful way to altogether eliminate
distortions. Main reasons for distortions are instrument transformer design
characteristics, which are inherent to instrument transformers. Characteristics
and their impact on distortions are discussed in the Chapter II.
2. Protection IEDs are sensitive to signal distortions. This sensitivity can, in cer-
tain cases, cause misoperation of IEDs. Since distortions originate inside instru-
ment transformers, we can regard distortions as direct influence of instrument
transformers. Negative impacts of distortions are discussed in Chapter III.
How can the influence of instrument transformers be measured ? The influence
can be measured by defining criteria in a context of the protection system functions.
The evaluation can be done by comparing performance of the functions in two cases:
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1) functions exposed to signals supplied by a referent instrument transformer, 2)
functions exposed to signals supplied by instrument transformers under investigation.
Difference in numerical values of the performance indices are a clear and effective
indicator of the mentioned influence. This concept of comparison is discussed in
section F.
What are the means for quantifying the influence (finding numerical values) ?
There are well-defined performance indices for various protection elements and func-
tions in the literature [13]-[16]. These indices can be adapted to serve as a quantitative
indicator of the influence of the instrument transformers on the protection function
performance. Practical definition of the criteria, taken from [16], is given in sections
C and D. It is important to note again that, index values itself are NOT an indicator
of the mentioned influence; rather, the DIFFERENCE in values is the indicator.
What is the best procedure for finding the quantitative values of the instrument
transformer influence ? The best procedure is a statistical analysis of the performance
of the protection system. Statistical methods can be used as a tool to quickly and
efficiently sort through large number of test cases, and derive values of indices. The
basis of the statistical analysis methodology are available in the literature [16]. One
particular statistical method will be developed later in the thesis.
What is the meaning of the quantitative values ? Quantitative values are sta-
tistical indicators of the function performance (to what extent the protection system
performance was satisfactory ?). The difference in the numerical values for the cases
defined in the first question is a numerical indicator of the influence of instrument
transformers on the function performance.
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H. Conclusion
This chapter introduced criteria for evaluation of the signal distortions on IEDs. First,
the reasons for doing so were discussed. Separate criteria was defined for different
elements of IEDs. It was shown how particular distortions, caused by certain instru-
ment transformer characteristics, can be targeted for evaluation. One application of
this targeting, methodology for evaluation, was also discussed.
The conclusion of the chapter is that presented criteria can be used as an effective
and meaningful mean for identification of influence of distortions. The criteria is based
on quantitative values, which means that evaluation is exact and comprehensive.
Based on this, a new methodology for evaluation was defined. They key elements of
the methodology are: 1) reasons why evaluation is necessary, 2) criteria for evaluation,
3) tools for evaluation, 4) interpretation of evaluation results. All elements were
explained. It was concluded that the new methodology presents a systematic and
exhaustive approach to the problem posed in the first, introductory chapter. Based
on the definition of the new methodology, a simulation approach will be presented in
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
EVALUATION THROUGH MODELING AND SIMULATION
A. Introduction
The performance indices, defined in previous chapter, may be calculated by analyzing
output signals of IEDs. Outputs of IEDs are triggered by certain input signals.
Options for generating IED inputs to obtain output signals are:
• Field-recorded data
• Signals obtained from simulations
If the field recorded data contains all the signals necessary for calculation of
performance indices, then the indices can be derived directly from the data. What
are the necessary signals depends on the nature of indices. Since large number of
signal cases is desirable (field recordings may not be sufficient), the simulation often
proves to be a more practical approach.
This chapter describes evaluation through modelling and simulation. Simulation
approach will be addressed first. Next, power network, instrument transformer, and
IED models will be listed and described. The reasons for their selection will also
be discussed. Afterwards, scenarios for simulations will be defined. The material
presented in this chapter is a background for software implementation, presented in
the next chapter.
B. Simulation Approach
As mentioned in the introduction, IED model responses are initiated by input signals
derived by simulating signals corresponding to various power system events (faults,
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disturbances, etc.). The input signals, derived from simulating a given event, con-
stitute a single exposure [14]. In this thesis, exposure is defined as a 3-phase set of
current and voltage waveforms, that represent given power system event. An example
of exposure is shown in Fig. 18 (in Chapter III). The fault for which the exposure
was captured is a phase-A-to-ground (AG) fault, without phase-to-ground resistance.
As can be seen in the figure, exposure contains steady-state waveforms, followed by
a transient after the inception of fault. Signals, that make an exposure, trigger IED
model to perform certain operations, and to issue certain output signals, if necessary.
Correct IED model response may be either issuing a trip signal, or restraining from
tripping.
Objective of the simulation is to subject IED models to a large number of expo-
sures and record IED responses. Afterwards, the recorded data is used for derivation
of performance indices. The simulation procedure can be summarized in the following
steps :
1. Create a database of exposures by simulating events using power network model
2. Feed the exposures into the models of instrument transformers and IEDs
3. Record necessary IED output signals (from both the measuring and decision
making algorithm)
The steps are illustrated in Fig. 31. Shaded elements produce output that is
stored for future use. Two main elements of a simulation are:
1. Models
2. Scenarios
In the following sections, models used in simulation will be described. Importance of
proper selection of models will be emphasized. Afterwards, scenarios will be defined.
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Fig. 31. Steps of the simulation procedure
C. Simulation Models
1. Power Network Model
Model of the power network should accurately capture dynamic characteristic of dis-
turbances, including faults. Network interconnections should be included as Thevenin
equivalents. Power network model selected for simulations is a 9-bus, 11-lines, 345
kV power system section. Fig. 32 shows one-line diagram of the network. The model
was developed according to example given in reference [31]. The example is based on
a realistic power network section.
2. Current Transformer Models
Models of instrument transformers should include features that accurately represent
their characteristics, discussed in Chapter II. Four current transformer models were
chosen for evaluation. All the models have the same general equivalent circuit, shown
in Fig. 33. The circuit is proposed as suitable for simulation in the literature [8], [10],
[26].
Differences between models are in their parameters. Parameters were chosen to
be representative of current transformer characteristics that can cause distortions.
Saturation, the major cause of distortion, is mainly dependent on the current trans-
former burden and V-I characteristic of the electromagnetic core. Therefore, two
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different burdens and two different V-I characteristics were chosen. Combining them
gives total of four model cases. Parameter selection for models is shown in Table V.
The selected burdens are ZB1 = 1.33 + j0.175Ω and ZB2 = 8.33 + j0.175Ω. The
magnitude of the burdens are 1.34 Ω and 8.33 Ω, which is equivalent to standard
burden B-1 and B-8, defined in IEEE standard [22] (see Table III, in Chapter II).
The two characteristics are shown in Fig. 34. The rest of model parameters are shown
in Fig. 33.
3. CCVT Models
Choice of CCVT/voltage transformer models followed the same approach as choice of
current transformer models. Since power network model used in simulations is high-
voltage (HV) transmission network, CCVT was selected as an appropriate voltage-
transforming device. Voltage transformer is included as a part of CCVT, as additional
step-down element. Four models were chosen for evaluation. Subsidence transient,
major cause of signal distortions, is dependent mainly on CCVT burden and config-
uration. For this reason, two different burdens and two different configurations were
chosen. Parameters selection for models is shown in Table VI. Burdens are: resistive
burden ZB1 = 100Ω, and inductive burden ZB2 = j100Ω. This choice of burden is
often found in literature, when evaluating CCVT characteristics [10], [24]. The two
configurations are shown in Fig. 35.
Table V. Parameters of CT models
Model Burden Characteristic
1 ZB1 1
2 ZB2 1
3 ZB1 2
4 ZB2 2
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Fig. 34. V-I characteristics of the current transformer core
4. IED Models
Models of IEDs should include all the functional elements of the original IEDs. Output
signals from functional elements should be available (e.g. measuring algorithm should
have output available to the user - most of the readily available models in the literature
do not poses this feature).
Two IED models were selected for simulations: IED model A and IED model B.
Table VI. Parameters of CCVT models
Model Burden Configuration
1 ZB1 1
2 ZB2 1
3 ZB1 2
4 ZB2 2
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Fig. 35. Configurations of CCVT models
Model A represent a line overcurrent protection relay. The model offers the following
features:
• Three-phase directional instantaneous overcurrent relaying, if used as a primary
protection
• Three-phase time overcurrent relaying, if used as a backup protection
The elements and flowchart of model A are shown in Fig. 36. Elements of the
IED model A are:
• Measuring algorithm performs extraction of current and voltage phasor from
the signals supplied by instrument transformers. Extraction is performed by
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Fourier algorithm. The phasor values are multiplexed together and sent to
overcurrent element.
• Overcurrent element consists of three sub-elements, each providing protection
by a certain operating principle. The sub-elements are:
1. Time overcurrent protection. This protection provides fast operation time
for high fault currents, and slow operation when light currents are detected.
This results in inverse time characteristic.
2. Ground time overcurrent protection. This protection operates when a fault
involving ground is detected. It uses the same type of characteristics as
the time overcurrent protection.
3. Directional protection. This protection is designed to operate for faults in
a certain direction. This protection element uses direction of the flow of
the current or power to determine whether a fault is in the direction of
protected line.
• Logic element applies logic functions (AND,OR) on the assertion signals pro-
duced by the protection element and operates the circuit breakers only when a
fault current is sufficiently high and when the fault is detected in the direction
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of interest. Otherwise, logic element restraints the relay from asserting the trip
signal.
Output signals of IED model A are available for capturing. They are recorded
to database of IED responses, together with trip signals. Settings for the IED model
A are:
• Nominal current on input of IED model is In=5 A.
• Pickup current is set to twice the nominal value: Ipickup=10 A.
• Extra inverse time-current characteristic was used. This characteristic is defined
as [32]:
toperate =
13.5 · k
In − 1
(5.1)
Time-parameter k was chosen as: k=0.02. This characteristic allows for efficient
distinction between near-end and far-end faults on the protected line Sky-STP,
because of the parameters of the transmission line (length and impedance).
More on the selected inverse-time characteristic can be found in reference [32].
The plot of characteristic is shown in Fig. 37.
IED model B represents a transmission line distance (impedance) protection
relay. Protection features implemented in the model are [29]:
• Three separate MHO forward sensing zones for multi-phase faults
• Three separate quadrilateral forward sensing zones for phase to ground faults
• One MHO reverse sensing zone for multi-phase faults
• One quadrilateral reverse sensing zone for phase to ground faults
• Six separate MHO starters, one for each fault-measured loop
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• Undervoltage element
The elements and flowchart of model B are shown in Fig. 38. Elements of the
IED model B are:
• Measuring algorithm calculates fault impedance using differential equation al-
gorithm. Fault impedance is calculated according to fault expressions for 6 basic
types of faults (AG, BG, CG, ABC, BC, CA). The calculation is performed us-
ing combinations of input currents and voltages. Fault impedance is calculated
for every of the six types of faults and sent to the fault identification element.
• Fault calculation element determines whether calculated impedance represents
a fault within zones of protection. The check is performed for every zone and
for every fault type. The output of the element is a signal indicating whether
there is a fault. Output signals for each of the zones are multiplexed and sent
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to the fault classification element.
• Fault classification element determines the type of detected fault. The output
of this element is not necessary for the assertion of trip signal. However, it
provides valuable information for the protection engineers.
• Logic element performs logic operations to derive a correct trip signal. Logic
functions such as AND, OR are used to trip in the case of a fault or trip restrain
for a fault out of the operational zones.
IED model B does not allow for capturing of the output signals of the measuring
algorithm. Only the trip signals can be recorded. Settings for the IED model B are:
• Two zones of protection are set. First (primary) zone of protection covers
80% of Sky-STP transmission line (ZSky−STP = 95.4 6 83.81
◦Ω). Intentional trip
time-delay for faults detected in this zones is set to 0 ms. Second (backup)
zone covers remainder (80% through 100%) of the Sky-STP transmission line.
Time-delay for trip for the faults in this zones is set to 20 power system cycles
(333 ms).
• Operating characteristics are selected as mho zones. The operating character-
istics, as well as the protected line itself, are shown in Fig. 39.
69
−40 −20 0 20 40 60
0
20
40
60
80
100
ZSky−STP=95.4∠83.81
°Ω
Bus Sky
Bus STP
Zone 1
Zone 2
Fig. 39. Coverage of MHO zones of the IED model B
Connection of IED models to instrument transformer models and power network
model are shown in Fig. 40.
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Fig. 40. Connection of IED and instrument transformer models
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D. Simulation Scenarios
Events are organized according to simulation scenarios. The scenarios definition con-
sists of:
1. Timeline of events
2. Features of events
Timeline defines time points when each of the events starts and when it finishes.
Event is usually modelled by a sequence of switching of power network circuit breakers.
Switchings allow for a modification of network topology, thus simulating faults and
disturbances. The events are characterized by their features. Examples of features
are: location of the event along the transmission line, associated resistances (such as
ground or line-to-line resistances), point-on-wave of fault inception and so on.
In this thesis, two scenarios were defined, for two models of IEDs. The events
were selected to emulate situations when the influence of instrument transformers can
be critical.
Different scenarios were defined for IED models A and B, as shown in Tables
VII and VIII. In the case of IED model A, faults were simulated both in forward
and backward zone of protection. IED model is expected to operate for faults in the
forward zone of protection, while it is expected to restrain from operating (issuing a
trip signal) for faults in the backward zone of protection. In the case of IED model
B, faults were simulated in zones 1 and 2. Fault locations were chosen to test IED
response of both primary and backup zone of protection.
Three types of faults are simulated: phase-to-ground (AG) and phase-to-phase
(BC) faults, as well as their combination (ABCG). The model should be transparent
to different types of faults (considering selectivity and operational time). Every fault
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Table VII. Simulation scenario, IED model A
Feature Parameters
Fault type AG, BC, ABCG
Fault location [%] -10, 10, 70, 90
Resistance [Ω] 0, 5
Point-on-wave [deg] 0, 45, 90, 135, 180, 225, 270, 315
type is simulated at four locations along the (protected) Sky-STP line. In the case
of testing IED model A, locations are: -10 %, 10 %, 70 %, 90 %. First location, -10
% means that faults are simulated in the backward direction, on the line Sky-Spruce
(starting from bus Sky). When testing IED model B, locations are: 70 %, 75 %, 85
% and 90 %. Faults at the first two locations should be detected (by IED model B)
as belonging to the first zone, while faults at second two locations should be detected
as belonging to second zone. Locations at 75 % and 85 % (of the line length) are
close (in relaying terms) to the 80 % zone boundary. These locations were chosen
to check whether IED model may underreach or overreach. Every fault is simulated
using two fault-resistances: 0Ω and 5Ω. In the case of phase-to-ground faults, the
resistance is the phase-to-grounding resistance, while in the case of phase-to-phase
faults, the resistance is the phase-to-phase resistance. The value of 5Ω was chosen to
emulate fault resistance that can be found in realistic situations. Finally, every fault
Table VIII. Simulation scenario, IED model B
Feature Parameters
Fault type AG, BC, ABCG
Fault location [%] 70, 75, 85, 90
Resistance [Ω] 0, 5
Point-on-wave [deg] 0, 45, 90, 135, 180, 225, 270, 315
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is simulated starting at 8 different fault inception moments (point-on-wave), covering
range of one 60 Hz cycle in 8 equal, consecutive time-steps. Total number of cases
generated for each of IED models is: 3 · 4 · 2 · 8 = 192.
E. Benefits and Limitations of the Simulation Approach
Simulation approach has distinctive benefits, as well as limitations, when compared
to different approaches, such as hardware testing. When deciding upon the use of the
simulation approach, both the limitations and benefits should be carefully considered.
Benefits of the simulation approach are:
• In the evaluation stages, problematic components of instrument transformers
can be identified using simulation approach. This is valid under assumption
that models of instrument transformers and protective relays are available for
evaluation.
• Simulation approach is a great tool for educational purposes. It provides a novel
insight into evaluation of influence of instrument transformers on internal com-
ponents of IEDs. This insight creates much better understanding of interaction
between instrument transformers and power system protection system.
Limitations of the simulation approach are:
• Evaluation of existing instrument transformers and IEDs is limited by the avail-
ability of models of devices. At present, there is only a small number of com-
mercial protective relay and instrument transformer models (in the available
literature). In other cases, models may exist but may not be readily available
to the user.
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• Most of the commercial protective relays do not provide access to output sig-
nals of the measurement unit. Some commercial relays (e.g. SEL-321) provide
recordings of some internal measurements. The mentioned recording can be
used to derive some of the performance indices (allowing for at least partial use
of simulation approach).
F. Conclusion
This chapter described simulation approach to evaluation of influence of instrument
transformers. First, details about the approach, such as types of data and procedures
to be used, were discussed. The role of models was also addressed. Next, models of
power network, instrument transformers and IEDs were described. The reasons for
choice of models was explained. Elements and structure for each IED model were also
presented. Settings for IED models were defined. Afterwards, simulation scenarios
were defined. Event features of scenarios were selected to exacerbate possible critical
influence of instrument transformer models on IED models.
Conclusion of the chapter is that by proper choice of models, effective and mean-
ingful results can be obtained through simulation. An advantage of simulation ap-
proach over field collected data was pointed out: amount of data collected from field
recording can be insufficient for proper evaluation of influence of instrument trans-
formers. Therefore, simulation approach is a suitable mean for implementing the
evaluation methodology.
Material presented in this chapter is a theoretical background for the next chap-
ter. Next chapter describes software implementation of simulation approach: simula-
tion environment.
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CHAPTER VI
SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION
A. Introduction
Simulation environment was developed to support the evaluation methodology. The
implementation consists of several software modules that can be used either indi-
vidually, or as combined package. Simulation environment is expandable. Existing
software modules can be modified (adjusted) or new modules can be added to the
package, according to needs and objectives of the user.
Structure of input and output (I/O) data is shown in Fig. 41. As can be seen,
the environment allows the user to evaluate different combinations of various models
of power networks, IEDs and instrument transformers. The evaluation of the same
models can be done under multiple different event scenarios. Output data consists of
numerical values of performance indices (see Chapter IV).
Main features of the environment are automation of the test procedure, compre-
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Fig. 41. Structure of the I/O data
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hensiveness of the results and flexibility of the use. Automation means that testing
is performed with a minimal user interaction (without any loss of accessibility or
modifiability of relevant simulation parameters). The comprehensiveness means a
sufficient number of test cases is always covered, while each case presents protection
system conditions with a sufficient number of parameters. Flexibility means: 1) differ-
ent instrument transformer and IED models can be integrated into testing, allowing
the user to test and compare influence of various instrument transformer versions
and designs, 2) results can be generated in the form of graphs and tables that can
be directly imported into various text processors, allowing the user to quickly and
efficiently analyze final results.
This chapter describes elements, structure and software implementation of the
simulation environment. Special attention is given to explaining I/O structures and
flowcharts of various elements. The reason for doing so is to give information to the
user who wishes to modify or expand the environment, or wishes to use data generated
by the environment in additional studies. User interface is also discussed.
B. Structure of the Simulation Environment
Main functional elements and flowchart of the environment are shown in Fig. 42.
There are three main elements:
1. Exposure generator
2. Exposure replayer
3. Statistical analyzer
Output of the environment are tables containing numerical values of performance
indices (see Chapters IV and V). In the process of derivation of mentioned indices,
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environment creates three databases of intermediate results. The databases are:
1. Database of exposures
2. Database of model responses
3. Database of performance indices
The following section describes options for implementation of the software environ-
ment and databases.
C. Options for Software Implementation
There are many possible options for software platforms that can be used to implement
simulation environment. The following software packages have been used to develop
the environment:
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• Alternative Transient Program (ATP) [23]. This program is a version of Electro-
magnetic Transient Program (EMTP). Purpose of ATP package is simulation of
transient waveforms associated with electromagnetic phenomena in power net-
works. Program also has the option of frequency analysis. ATP development
was continuous over the last 20 years. Contributors in development are inter-
national, while the coordinator is the Canadian/American ATP Users Group
(available online: www.emtp.org).
Input of ATP are text files, called scripts. Scripts consist of a list of power
network elements and their connections. Together, elements and connections
define a model of a network. Basic operation of ATP is calculation of variables
of interest (current and voltages), as functions of time. Variables of interest
are defined by the user. Calculation is based on solving differential equations
that describe behavior of system components in time domain. Trapezoidal rule
of integration is used for solving. There are two ways of determining initial
conditions: 1) initial steady-state (phasor) solution of the system model, 2)
initial values specified by the user (for some components).
Extensive library of power system component models is available in the cur-
rent version of ATP. Models include: rotating machines, transformers, surge
arresters, transmission lines, cables, etc. By combining mentioned components,
complex networks can be built. Additional feature of the program allows for
analysis of control systems, power electronics equipment and components with
nonlinear characteristics, such as arcs, corona and saturable electromagnetic
core. When simulating events, both symmetric and asymmetric disturbances
are allowed.
• Matlab [33]. The name Matlab stands for Matrix Laboratory. Matlab is a high-
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Table IX. Implementation of the software environment
Package Usage
ATP Implementation of power network and instrument transformer models
Generation of exposure waveforms
Matlab Replaying of exposure waveforms
Statistical analysis of IED model responses
Creation of output data tables
Simulink Implementation of IED models
Generation of IED response signals
performance language for technical computing. It represents the state-of-the-art
in software for matrix computation. One of the main parts of the program is
Matlab language. This language is a high-level matrix/array language, with
control flow statements, functions, data structures, input/output and object-
oriented programming features. Such a structure allows for creating large and
complex application programs using relatively simple instructions.
• Simulink [34]. Simulink is Matlab’s companion program. Its purpose is simulat-
ing nonlinear dynamic system models. Types of systems that can be modelled
using Simulink include linear, nonlinear, continuous-time, discrete-time, multi-
variable and multi-rate. Main feature of the program is attractive, easy-to-use
graphical user interface (GUI). This interface allows for building of models by
simply placing system components on the work sheet and specifying connections
between them. In order to simulate power network systems, Power Blockset can
be used [35]. This blockset is an additional library of system components that
model power network elements. Power blockset presents a specialized applica-
tion of Simulink.
Table IX gives an overview of implementation options for the software environment.
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Table X. Simulation environment installation files
Directory Content (files)
scenario scripts insert fault distributed.m, insert fault lumped.m,
branch distributed.m, insert parameters.m, branch lumped.m, in-
sert vt.m, cases.m, parameters.m, connection.m, resistor.m, cp.m,
s fmt.m, ct.m, s fmt cardinal.m, ct model.m, scenario.m, dl.m,
setup.m, exec.m, exposures.m, swtch.m, extract steady state.m,
uniform names.m, fault.m, vt.m, init.m, vt model.m, insert ct.m,
insert fault.m
overcurrent scripts dec data.m, meas data.m, oc data.m, overcurrent.m,
get signals.m, oc average.m, oc test.m
distance scripts d average.m, d dec data.m, distance.m, d data.m, d test.m
general scripts flip slashes.m, get list.m, create table.m, remove underscore.m
models StpPlain10kHz5sec.atp, HYST.pch, HYST 2.pch, ml.m, fl.m
D. Simulation Environment Setup
Simulation environment consists of Matlab and ATP script files. The files are orga-
nized in five directories. The contents of the directories are shown in Table X. The
mentioned files are delivered as a single ZIP file “simenv.zip”. This ZIP file is an
archive, containing the files and directory structure shown in Table X. Once decom-
pressed (unpacked), the simulation environment is ready for use. The directory where
the simulation environment software files are stored is designated as “root” directory
(use of this directory is discussed in more detail in Section E). The location of “root”
directory can be specified through simulation environment initialization (described in
more detail in Section E). In order to use the simulation environment, the following
software packages should be installed on the computer:
1. Matlab (recommended version 5.3 [33], other versions not tested for compati-
bility)
2. Simulink (recommended version 5.3 [34], other versions not tested for compati-
bility)
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3. ATP (recommended version compiled by Watcom Fortran [23], other versions
not tested for compatibility)
E. Initialization of the Simulation Environment
Before running the simulation environment, it is necessary to perform initialization.
This is done by invoking script “init.m”. This script defines necessary global vari-
ables (variables that are accessible from every other script). Some important global
variables are:
• root: this variable defines the location (path) to the simulation environment
files. This location can be freely adjusted by the user.
• models: this variable defines the location (path) to models of power network
Another important aspect of initialization is creation of database structure. Once the
script “init.m” is finished with execution, all the necessary directories and subdirec-
tories are created (within the root directory) (databases are discussed in more detail
in text to follow).
F. Exposure Generator
The most complex module of the environment is the exposure generator. As the name
implies, objective of this module is building a database of exposures.
1. I/O Data Structure
Input of the module consists of:
1. Scenario definition
2. Instrument transformer models
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fault_bus1=’Sky’;
fault_bus2=’STP’;
fault_type=[1,2,5];
fault_location=[10,70,90];
fault_resistance=[1e-6,10];
fault_time=[0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8]*0.01667/8;
Fig. 43. Definition of a scenario
3. Power network models
Scenario definition was discussed in Chapter V. Scenario for the simulation
environment can be defined within script “exposures.m”. The definition simply lists
event features. As an example, definition of a scenario for evaluation of CCVT models
(as discussed in Chapter V) is shown in Fig. 43.
The input data in a form of event features should be supplemented with the data
about location of instrument transformers and their connections to the power network
model. This supplemental information is also specified within script “exposures.m”.
An example is shown in Fig. 44.
The above-given input data specifies that the current transformer is connected
at the Sky bus, of Sky-STP line, as stated in the variables ct node1 and ct node2.
CT scale-down ratio is defined as 900:5, using variable ct ratio. Even though specific
ct_node1=’Sky’;
ct_node2=’STP’;
ct_ratio=900:5;
ct_burden=low_burden;
ct_model=1;
vt_node=’Sky’;
vt_ratio=345e3/112;
vt_burden=inductive_burden;
ct_model=2;
Fig. 44. Specifying instrument transformer connections with power network
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current transformer models used with the environment may have pre-set scale-down
ratio, user is still left with the freedom to manually set this ratio. The reason for
this is to allow small modifications to the ratio, usually in the limits of ±5% (e.g.
current transformer model with the ratio of 900:5 ca be used in simulations as having
the ration of (1.05 · 900 : 5). The same kind of specification are made for the CCVT,
using variables vt node and vt ratio.
Output data of exposure generators are the files containing exposure waveforms
(3 current and 3 voltage waveforms, corresponding to three phases). Waveforms are
stored in the form of Matlab matrix files. Matrix and vector variables which comprise
exposure file are:
1. Time vector t. Contains time scale produced by ATP.
2. Primary voltage signal vectors vVtnodea, vVtnodeb, vVtnodec. Mentioned
three vectors contain primary voltages, corresponding to three phases. Vtnode
is the name of the node where voltage transformer (or CCVT) is connected.
3. Secondary voltage signal vectors vVta, vVtb, vVtc. These three vectors con-
tain signals from the output of voltage transformer/CCVT models.
4. Primary current signal vectors iTerraCtsa, iTerraCtsb, iTerraCtsc. Men-
tioned three vectors contain primary current signals, from the transmission line
where current transformer is connected.
5. Secondary current signal vectors iCtnodeaCtpa, iCtnodebCtpb, iCtnodec-
Ctpc. These vectors, corresponding to three three phases, are obtained from
secondaries of current transformer model. Ctnode is the name of the node
(bus) where current transformer model is connected.
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6. Steady-state current phasor matrix i ss. These phasors, one for each phase,
correspond to currents in the transmission line (under investigation) during
steady-state faulted condition (after transient signals die-out). First row of the
matrix contains phasor magnitudes, while second row contains phasor angles.
7. Steady-state voltage phasor matrix v ss. Explanation is the same as for matrix
variable i ss.
8. Moment of the event start t start (scalar). This is scalar value that denotes
(in [s]) when the event starts.
9. Additional information fault data, ct data, vt data. This data is simply
copied content of scenario definition and instrument transformer connection
specifications (see Figs. 43 and 44). The reason for including these fields in the
structure is to enable efficient sorting of exposure files, when storing them into
the database.
The above vectors and matrices are nested within an object structure, denoted
signals. Therefore, each of the vectors or matrices can be accessed by putting the
object structure name (followed by a period) in form of the vector or matrix name,
e.g. signals.iTerraCtsa. An example of an exposure structure is shown in Fig. 45.
Exposure files are stored (organized) in the form of database. The structure of the
exposure database, created for scenarios defined in Chapter V, is shown in Table XI.
According to the table, root directory contains every one of the main directories.
In turn, each main directory contains all the subdirectories. Prefixes “oc ” and “d ”
denote IED model A (“oc” is short for overcurrent) and IED model B (“d” is short for
distance), respectively. All the exposure files, once generated, are stored in directory
called “exposures”, corresponding to IED and instrument transformer model. Utility
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script “cp.m” can be invoked afterwards to copy the exposure files from the mentioned
directory “exposures” into appropriate subdirectories, that classify the exposure files
according to the fault type (e.g. “d exposures abcg”).
Once an exposure is generated, it is stored into appropriate directory location
by the exposure generator. Complementary to database structure is the exposure file
naming system. Exposure files are named according to event features (event which,
through simulation, produced the exposure). Features that are used for file naming
are:
1. Nodes (bus) names of the line, where event takes place
2. Type of fault (capital letters)
3. Grounding resistance (denoted by letter ’r’)
signals =
t: [1835x1 double]
vSkya: [1835x1 double]
vSkyb: [1835x1 double]
vSkyc: [1835x1 double]
vVta: [1835x1 double]
vVtb: [1835x1 double]
vVtc: [1835x1 double]
iTerraCtsa: [1835x1 double]
iTerraCtsb: [1835x1 double]
iTerraCtsc: [1835x1 double]
iSkyaCtpa: [1835x1 double]
iSkybCtpb: [1835x1 double]
iSkycCtpc: [1835x1 double]
i_ss: [2x3 double]
v_ss: [2x3 double]
t_start: 0.0646
fault_data: [1x1 struct]
ct_data: [1x1 struct]
vt_data: [1x1 struct]
Fig. 45. Structure of an exposure
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Table XI. Structure of the exposures database
Root Directory Main Directories Subdirectories
results ct ref exposures
ct 1 oc exposures abcg
ct 2 oc exposures ag
ct 3 oc exposures bc
ct 4 d exposures abcg
ccvt 1 d exposures ag
ccvt 2 d exposures bc
ccvt 3
ccvt 4
4. Location of the fault along the line (denoted by letter ’l’)
5. Index number of time-point of the event (denoted by letter ’t’)
The features are included in the file name in the order as given above. All files carry
extension ’mat’, which is standard extension for Matlab matrix files. An example of
the exposure file name is “FAULT Sky Spr AG r5 l10 t4.mat”
2. Flowchart
Flowchart of the exposure generator is shown in Fig. 46. Generation of transient
waveforms (exposures), corresponding to scenario events, is carried out by invoking
ATP software. Exposure generator creates a script file based on models of power net-
work, instrument transformer models and scenario definition (input data). Flowchart
of the algorithm that performs the creation of the script is shown in Fig. 46(b). The
algorithm reads line-by-line the text file containing description of the network model.
Every line is analyzed until the line containing information about protected trans-
mission line is found. Once it is found, it is divided into two lines, by inserting a new
bus in the original line. New bus is a point on the line where events can be simulated
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Fig. 46. Flowchart of the exposure generator
(e.g. faults). Ratio of impedances of newly formed lines is chosen to simulate loca-
tion of the event, along the line. Total impedance of both (sub)lines is equal to the
impedance of the original line. This process is illustrated in Fig. 47.
The figure illustrates division of the protected line Sky-STP. Figure shows only
one phase of the three-phase line (other phases involve same circuitry). New bus,
named ’Sky1’ is inserted. The impedance of the segment Sky-Sky1 is 25% of the
original Sky-STP line. This way, the location of the simulated event is fixed at 25%
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Fig. 47. Division of a transmission line (branch)
of the line length. The actual division of the line is performed by an algorithm, shown
in Fig. 46(c). This algorithm generates text lines, that are inserted into the original
ATP script. At this point, instrument transformer models (current transformer and
voltage transformer/CCVT) are also inserted, in the form of text lines. The text lines
define new buses and connections, as shown in Fig. 48. In the figure, labels (names) in
italic (e.g. Sky,STP,etc.) denote labels of the nodes, while normal-type labels denote
respective component value (e.g. C1 is the value of capacitance). An example of ATP
script generated by the exposure generator can be found in Appendix A.
After the circuit shown in Fig. 48 is inserted, a time-point for closing the switch
is specified (topen in the figure). Closing of the switch simulates a fault. By placing
the switch at suitable locations, both phase-to-ground and phase-to-phase faults can
be simulated. Former faults are simulated by placing switch between two phases
(lines). Ground faults involve placement of switch between phase (line) and ground,
as illustrated in Fig. 48.
The final script file is created when both the fault and instrument transformer
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Fig. 48. Insertion of the fault and instrument transformer connections
circuits have been inserted. This script is processed once more, to insert simulation
parameters, such as duration of simulation (in [s]), time-step (in [s]), power system
frequency (in [Hz]), and similar (more on these parameters can be found in reference
[23]). The final script is then sent to ATP for execution. During the execution of ATP
script, flow control is surrendered to ATP. When ATP is finished with generating the
transient waveform, flow control is returned to the exposure generator. Next step
is to check whether all the scenario events have been executed (k > N , where k is
the index number of currently simulated event, while N is total number of events in
scenario). Exposure generator is terminated when a scenario has been completed.
Once the database of exposures has been built, exposures replayer can be used to
expose IED models to captured waveforms. Exposure replayer is described in the
next section.
G. Exposure Replayer
Objective of the exposure replayer module is exposing IED models to waveforms cor-
responding to power system events. Replayer module obtains mentioned waveforms
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from the database of exposures, generated by exposure generator. Other sources can
also be used, such as custom-built database of field-recorded data.
1. I/O Data Structure
Input of the module consists of:
1. Pointer to database of exposures
2. Pointer to IED models
First pointer is variable root (global variable), which value specifies root direc-
tory location of the exposure database (see Table XI). Second pointer is the file name
of the Simulink model of IED (this point will be discussed in more detail in the text
to follow).
Output of exposure replayer are files containing IED model response signals. As
before, files are stored as Matlab matrix files, with standard extension “mat”. In the
case of IED model A, mentioned signals are recorded at two points:
1. Output of measuring element
2. Output of decision making element
In the case of IED model B, signals are recorded only at output of decision making
element.
File naming system used in the exposure replayer is similar as in the exposure
generator. The only difference is in the file name prefix. Measuring element output
is stored in the file named starting with “OC M” (“M” is short for measuring), while
decision making element output is stored in files starting with “OC D” and “D D”
(“D” is short for decision making).
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Measuring file contains two object structures, called i and v. Both structure
contains the same variables. In the case of structure i mentioned variables contain
signals from current-measurement element, while in the case of v, the signals are from
voltage-measurement element. The variables are:
1. Steady-state phasor matrix ss. The meaning of this variable is the same as in
the case of exposure generator (see previous section).
2. Measured phasor magnitude and phase vectors a amp, a ph, b amp, b ph,
c amp, c ph. These vectors contains signals measured by the Fourier algorithm
measuring element.
3. Original exposure waveform vectors a, b, c. Vectors containing copies of original
waveforms (that are sent to the input of measuring element), corresponding to
three phases, are included for use by statistical analyzer, which will be discussed
in the next section.
4. Time vector t and moment of the event start t start (scalar). Meaning is
similar to the exposure generator (see previous section). There is difference,
however: the time scale, contained in vector t is generated by Simulink, which
may be (and usually is) different than the one generated by ATP. ATP generates
time scale with equally spaced time-points, while Simulink, depending on the
chosen solving method, may produce time scale where time-steps are not equal.
Decision making file contains two vector and one scalar variable. The variables
are:
1. Time vector t and moment of the event start t start (scalar). Meaning is the
same as in the case of the measuring file.
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2. Trip signal vector trip. This vectors contains trip signal derived by decision
making element.
Mentioned measuring and decision making files are stored (organized) in the form
of database. The structure of the response database, created for scenarios defined
in Chapter V, is shown in Table XII. This database has the same structure as
the database of exposures (see Table XI). The content of the response database
is complementary to content of exposure database. Together, the two databases
form one, general database. This database can also be used outside the simulation
environment.
2. Flow Chart
Flowchart of the exposure generator is shown in Fig. 49(a). Replayer performs a
loop, in which exposures are sequentially read from the database, and replayed. The
loop is performed until the database has been exhausted (k > N , where k is the
index number of currently replayed exposure, while N is total number of exposures
in database). Actions performed to replay an exposure are:
1. Set variables i in and v in to contain exposure. The content of these vari-
ables is sent directly to IED model using Simulink. The Matlab code that
performs this is shown in Fig. 50. In the code, variable s contains exposure (see
Fig. 45), while variable ref flag determines what instrument transformer is be-
ing evaluated (referent instrument transformer, current transformer or voltage
transformer/CCVT). Variables i in and v in are a communication channel be-
tween simulation environment and Simulink. This communication is shown in
Fig. 51. Different IED models can be incorporated into simulation environment
by observing structure of variables i in, v in.
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2. Execute Simulink model file. By starting the simulation, flow control is tem-
porarily transferred to Simulink. The flow control is returned to exposure
replayer once the exposure has been replayed, and necessary IED response
data has been recorded. The execution of IED model is done using command
sim(’systemtotal’,t max). The sequence “systemtotal.mdl” is the file name
of overcurrent protection IED model implemented in Simulink (hence the ex-
tension “mdl”). It can be replaced by any other model of an IED, provided that
the model complies with simulation environment as shown in Fig. 51.
Table XII. Structure of the database of IED responses
Root Directory Main Directories Subdirectories
results ct ref oc abcg
ct 1 oc ag
ct 2 oc bc
ct 3 d abcg
ct 4 d ag
ccvt 1 d bc
ccvt 2
ccvt 3
ccvt 4
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Fig. 49. Flowchart of the exposure replayer and the statistical analyzer
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s=get_signals(var);
switch(ref_flag);
case 1
% referent testing:
% primary current signals referred to secondary
i_in.signals.values=s(1:3,:)’/ct_ratio;
% primary voltage signals
v_in.signals.values=s(7:9,:)’;
case 2
% ct testing:
% secondary current signals
i_in.signals.values=s(4:6,:)’;
% primary voltage signals
v_in.signals.values=s(7:9,:)’;
case 3
% vt testing:
% primary current signals (referred to secondary)
i_in.signals.values=s(1:3,:)’/ct_ratio;
% secondary voltage signals referred to primary
v_in.signals.values=s(10:12,:)’*vt_ratio;
end;
i_in.time=s(13,:)’;
v_in.time=s(13,:)’;
Fig. 50. Matlab code for setting input variables
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i_abc, v_abc, trip
Simulink
IED model
input output
Matlab workspace
variables:
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Fig. 51. Communication between the simulation environment and Simulink
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H. Statistical Analyzer
Objective of the statistical analyzer is derivation of numerical values of performance
indices, defined in Chapter IV. The calculation is carried out as described in Chap-
ter IV.
1. I/O Data Structure
Input of the statistical analyzer is a pointer to top of the database of responses (path
to root directory). This pointer is specified using variable root (global variable).
Output of statistical analyzer are files, containing performance indices. Files are
stored as Matlab matrix files, carrying extension “mat”. In case of IED model A,
the indices are calculated for both measuring and decision making elements, while in
case of model B, indices are calculated only for decision making element.
File naming convention used in the statistical analyzer is simple: file name prefix
for IED model A is “OCDATA ”, and for model B the prefix is “DDATA ”. The prefix
is followed by the instrument transformer model, which was used in simulations for
derivation of particular indices (stored in the file). Prefix is followed by the name of
instrument transformer model. An example of a file containing performance indices
is “OCDATA ct 1.mat”. Mentioned files are stored according to the structure of the
response database, shown in Table XII. One file, containing performance indices, is
stored in each of subdirectories.
Performance indices file contains two structures: m and d. The first one con-
tains performance indices for measuring element, while the second structure contains
indices for decision making element. First structure is present only in the case of IED
model A indices.
Structure m has two sub-structures: i and v. First sub-structure contains indices
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for current measuring element, while second sub-structure contains indices for voltage
measuring element. The variables contained in sub-structures are:
1. Gain for the DC component dc gain a, dc gain b, dc gain c.
2. Aggregated index F F a, F b, F c.
3. Settling time s a, s b, s c.
4. Overshoot o a, o b, o c.
5. Normalized error index, e a, e b, e c.
Structure d has two scalar variables:
1. Time-point of the start of event scalar t start.
2. Time-point of issuing a trip signal t trip. In the case of IED model B this
variable is not scalar, but a two-element vector, where first element denotes trip
time for zone 1, and second element denotes trip time for zone 2.
Performance indices file contains a sequence of sets of indices. Sets from one file
correspond to a subdirectory of a database of IED response. Subdirectories within
the structure of this database is where performance indices files are stored.
2. Data Formatter
Additional utility scripts, data formatters called “oc average” and “d average”, can
be used for finding average values of performance indices. Average values are found
by analyzing every file of performance indices and simply calculating the mean value
of all the indices store in that particular files. Mentioned utility modules also have
the ability of generating output data in form of tables. Tables can exported as:
97
• Matlab matrix, in the form of “mat” matrix file
• Plain ASCII text
• LaTeX format tables
3. Flowchart
Flowchart of the statistical analyzer is shown in Fig. 49(b). Similar as replayer,
statistical analyzer performs a loop, in which IED responses are sequentially read
from the database and analyzed. Analysis is the actual calculation of performance
indices, in accordance with definitions in Chapter IV. The loop is performed until
the response database has been exhausted (k > N , where k is the index number of
currently analyzed response, while N is total number of responses in database).
I. User Interface
User interface is in the form of Command Line Interpreter (CLI). Since elements
of the simulation environment are implemented as separate software modules, every
element can be executed irrespective of other elements. Elements are executed by
invoking Matlab scripts, that correspond to each element. This correspondence is
shown in Table XIII.
An illustration of usage and operation of the simulation environment is shown
in Figs. 52, 53, 54. Fig. 52 shows the usage of exposure generator, Fig. 53 shows
the usage of exposure replayer, Fig. 54 shows the usage of statistical analyzer. The
illustrations were captured directly from the Matlab work window. In the mentioned
scripts, symbol “>>” presents Matlab command prompt. Textual lines following the
command prompt are generated by the various scripts of the simulation environment.
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A sample of the ATP script generated by the exposure generator is given in
Appendix A. This sample is an example of how models of power network, instrument
transformers and IEDs are integrated and used together. The ATP script in Appendix
A describes a fault on the Sky-STP transmission line, where instrument transformers
are connected at the Sky bus. This ATP script is inserted into the ATP script of
the power network model (by the exposure generator) for simulation of power system
events.
Table XIII. Correspondence between elements and scripts
Element Scripts
Exposure generator exposures.m
Exposure replayer oc test.m
d test.m
Statistical analyzer oc data.m
d data.m
Data formatter oc average.m
d average.m
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>> init
INITIALIZATION
>> exposures
EXPOSURE GENERATOR
\results\ct_1\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 30.625 s
\results\ct_2\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 28.981 s
\results\ct_3\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 29.463 s
\results\ct_4\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 29.362 s
\results\ccvt_1\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 29.002 s
\results\ccvt_2\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 28.521 s
\results\ccvt_3\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 28.15 s
\results\ccvt_4\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 28.531 s
WARNING: node2 for ct changed
\results\ct_1\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 28.561 s
WARNING: node2 for ct changed
\results\ct_2\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 28.541 s
WARNING: node2 for ct changed
\results\ct_3\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 28.141 s
WARNING: node2 for ct changed
\results\ct_4\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 28.15 s
WARNING: node2 for ct changed
\results\ccvt_1\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 28.161 s
WARNING: node2 for ct changed
\results\ccvt_2\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 28.521 s
WARNING: node2 for ct changed
\results\ccvt_3\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 28.541 s
WARNING: node2 for ct changed
\results\ccvt_4\exposures\FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat modified
Elapsed time: 28.15 s
Fig. 52. Illustration of the exposure generator operation
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>> oc_test
[0] Processing file ct_1:FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[1] Processing file ct_1:FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[2] Processing file ct_2:FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[3] Processing file ct_2:FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[4] Processing file ct_3:FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[5] Processing file ct_3:FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[6] Processing file ct_4:FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[7] Processing file ct_4:FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[8] Processing file ct_ref:FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[9] Processing file ct_ref:FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[10] Processing file ccvt_1:FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[11] Processing file ccvt_1:FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[12] Processing file ccvt_2:FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[13] Processing file ccvt_2:FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[14] Processing file ccvt_3:FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[15] Processing file ccvt_3:FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[16] Processing file ccvt_4:FAULT_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[17] Processing file ccvt_4:FAULT_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
Elapsed time: 23.143 s
Fig. 53. Illustration of the exposure replayer operation
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>> d_data
[1] Processing D file ct_1:D_D_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[2] Processing D file ct_1:D_D_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
Created \results\ct_1\d_ag__\DDATA_ct_1.mat
[1] Processing D file ct_2:D_D_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[2] Processing D file ct_2:D_D_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
Created \results\ct_2\d_ag__\DDATA_ct_2.mat
[1] Processing D file ct_3:D_D_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[2] Processing D file ct_3:D_D_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
Created \results\ct_3\d_ag__\DDATA_ct_3.mat
[1] Processing D file ct_4:D_D_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[2] Processing D file ct_4:D_D_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
Created \results\ct_4\d_ag__\DDATA_ct_4.mat
[1] Processing D file ct_ref:D_D_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[2] Processing D file ct_ref:D_D_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
Created \results\ct_ref\d_ag__\DDATA_ct_ref.mat
[1] Processing D file ccvt_1:D_D_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[2] Processing D file ccvt_1:D_D_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
Created \results\ccvt_1\d_ag__\DDATA_ccvt_1.mat
[1] Processing D file ccvt_2:D_D_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[2] Processing D file ccvt_2:D_D_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
Created \results\ccvt_2\d_ag__\DDATA_ccvt_2.mat
[1] Processing D file ccvt_3:D_D_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[2] Processing D file ccvt_3:D_D_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
Created \results\ccvt_3\d_ag__\DDATA_ccvt_3.mat
[1] Processing D file ccvt_4:D_D_Sky_Spr_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
[2] Processing D file ccvt_4:D_D_Sky_Stp_AG___r0__l10_t1.mat...done
Created \results\ccvt_4\d_ag__\DDATA_ccvt_4.mat
Elapsed time: 1.623 s
Fig. 54. Illustration of the statistical analyzer operation
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J. Integration of Different Models
Simulation environment can be used with different power network, instrument trans-
former and IED models. The recommendations for use of different models is as
follows:
• Power network model is defined by ATP script, that contains description of
the network. The location of the mentioned ATP script is defined in variable
power network model (global variable) in script “init.m”. Different power
network models can be created as standard ATP scripts. ATP scripts should
be stored within “models” directory of the root directory.
• Instrument transformers are defined by Matlab scripts “ct model.m” and “vt model.m”.
Different instrument transformer models can be created using the template
stored in the mentioned Matlab scripts. Additional files (such as files “HYST.PCH”,
which define hysteresis curves) should be stored in “models” directory of the
root directory.
• IED models are defined by Simulink models. Location of these models can be
specified using Matlab and Simulink search path setting (see reference [33] for
specific instructions). Names of IED Simulink models are specified in scripts
“overcurrent.m” and “distance.m”. Different IED models can be defined by
specifying their names in the two mentioned script files. Different models
must follow the communication channels (between simulation environment and
Simulink) specified in Fig. 51. It is also important to store IED models response
in the following variables:
– i in, v in contain input current and voltage signals (from exposures, see
Fig. 45)
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– i abc, v abc, I abc, V abc receive output signals from the measuring
element (see Chapter V)
– trip receives output from the decision making element (see Chapter V)
K. Conclusion
Simulation environment and its software implementation were described in this chap-
ter. Simulation environment is a practical contribution of this thesis. It is imple-
mented in form of software modules. One of the goals of the simulation environment
is its expendability. This means that software was developed in such a way, that
user can modify or add software modules, according to his/her research objectives.
Special attention was paid to explanation of I/O data structure and flowchart of the
environment. Three major elements of the environment are: 1) exposure generator,
2) exposure replayer and 3) statistical analyzer. Implementation of the elements was
described and discussed first. Afterwards, user interface was explained. Together,
major elements and user interface form a comprehensive software package.
Conclusion is that simulation environment can be used for extensive research
in the area of instrument transformer evaluation. Simulation environment offers
seamless interaction between several software packages, such as ATP, Matlab and
Simulink. This interaction enables incorporation of wide variety of models of instru-
ment transformers and IEDs. Possible applications of the simulation environment,
beside evaluation of influence of instrument transformers, include evaluation of instru-
ment transformer response, comparison of different instrument transformer designs,
etc.
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CHAPTER VII
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY APPLICATION AND RESULTS
A. Introduction
This chapter presents application of the evaluation methodology. Results are obtained
by using simulation environment described in the previous chapter. As described in
Chapter VI, final results present average values of performance indices. Average
values were calculated according to the structure of the databases, as explained in
Chapter VI.
B. Impact on the IED Model A
IED model A has outputs available at both measuring element (current and voltage)
and decision making element (see section C of Chapter V). Therefore, influence of
instrument transformers on both elements was evaluated. Evaluation criteria is listed
and explained in Chapter IV. The results are presented in the following sections.
1. Interpretation of Performance Indices for the Measurement Element
In order to interpret the values of performance indices for the measurement element, it
is necessary to define what values of the indices are indication of expected (“good”)
performance, and what values are indication of unexpected (“bad”) performance.
Generally, the lower the value, the better (more expected) the performance. How-
ever, since it is unrealistic to expect zero values, the following values can be used as
indication of acceptable performance:
• Settling time (t2%) should be less than eight signal periods, i.e. 0.133 s
• Overshoot (∆y%) should be less than 10 %
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• Absolute value of normalized error index (|∆e%|) should be less than 5 %
• Gain for DC component (FRDC) should be less than 30 %
• Aggregated index (F ) should be less than 0.01
The chosen values simply reflect the preferences of the author. Selection of the
above mentioned values follows the practice defined in reference [16]. The values are
also based around typical average of the performance indices of the referent instrument
transformer.
2. Measurement Element Performance Indices
Values of performance indices for current measurement element of IED model A are
shown in Tables XIV through XVI. Values for voltage measurement element are
shown in Tables XVII through XIX.
Table XIV. Current measuring element, ABCG fault
Model t2% ∆y% ∆e% FRDC F
Referent 0.126 0.082 0.019 0.283 0.004
CT 1 0.126 0.079 0.070 0.175 0.005
CT 2 0.126 0.015 0.551 0.036 0.006
CT 3 0.126 0.100 0.054 0.215 0.005
CT 4 0.126 0.047 0.164 0.073 0.005
Table XV. Current measuring element, AG fault
Model t2% ∆y% ∆e% FRDC F
Referent 0.126 0.041 0.026 0.055 0.003
CT 1 0.126 0.044 0.100 0.038 0.003
CT 2 0.107 0.024 0.318 0.022 0.003
CT 3 0.126 0.045 0.052 0.041 0.003
CT 4 0.117 0.039 0.168 0.030 0.003
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Table XVI. Current measuring element, BC fault
Model t2% ∆y% ∆e% FRDC F
Referent 0.126 0.056 0.052 0.193 0.004
CT 1 0.126 0.055 0.115 0.127 0.004
CT 2 0.126 0.010 0.452 0.020 0.005
CT 3 0.126 0.070 0.085 0.150 0.004
CT 4 0.126 0.044 0.184 0.059 0.004
Table XVII. Voltage measuring element, ABCG fault
Model t2% ∆y% ∆e% FRDC F
Referent 0.126 0.029 -0.004 0.022 0.003
CCVT 1 0.126 0.043 0.000 0.018 0.002
CCVT 2 0.126 0.140 -0.001 0.018 0.003
CCVT 3 0.126 0.048 0.000 0.018 0.002
CCVT 4 0.126 0.179 -0.006 0.019 0.003
Table XVIII. Voltage measuring element, AG fault
Model t2% ∆y% ∆e% FRDC F
Referent 0.065 0.009 -0.035 0.011 0.001
CCVT 1 0.065 0.011 -0.030 0.011 0.001
CCVT 2 0.065 0.025 -0.030 0.011 0.001
CCVT 3 0.065 0.010 -0.030 0.011 0.001
CCVT 4 0.065 0.029 -0.031 0.011 0.001
Table XIX. Voltage measuring element, BC fault
Model t2% ∆y% ∆e% FRDC F
Referent 0.065 0.017 -0.153 0.010 0.001
CCVT 1 0.065 0.013 -0.150 0.008 0.001
CCVT 2 0.065 0.026 -0.150 0.008 0.001
CCVT 3 0.065 0.016 -0.150 0.008 0.001
CCVT 4 0.065 0.031 -0.150 0.008 0.001
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The following conclusions can be made, based on performance indices of the
current measuring element:
• Influence of instrument transformer models on the settling time is relatively
negligible (or small).
• Influence of instrument transformer models on overshoot varies significantly.
Smallest overshoot is caused by current transformer model 2. Overshoot caused
by this model is several times lower than the one caused by the referent instru-
ment transformer. Significant decrease in overshoot indicates current trans-
former saturation, as discussed in Chapter IV. Current transformer model 4
shows slightly larger overshoot than model 2, while the rest of models caused
overshoot levels close to what is found in the referent one.
• Influence on normalized error index also varies significantly. As in the case of
overshoot, current transformer model 2 caused largest error, in the range from
30 % to 56 %. This error range is significant, and indicates possible misoperation
by IED. Current transformer model 4 caused an increased error, at the level of
16 %, while the rest of the models did not cause the error to increase above 7
%.
• Influence on DC gain showed that current transformer model 2 suppresses DC
component better than the rest of the models. Since it was already concluded
that current transformer model 2 underwent saturation in significant number of
test cases, it can be concluded that saturation actually enhances suppression of
DC component. Current transformer model 4 also showed good DC suppression,
compared to the rest of the models.
• Influence of instrument transformer models on aggregated frequency index is
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negligible .
The following conclusions can be made, based on performance indices of voltage
measuring element:
• CCVT models do not influence the settling time.
• CCVT models 2 and 4 caused significantly higher overshoot than for the referent
one (overshoot is at least two times higher). The reason for this is the nature
of the burden connected to model 2 and 4: inductive. Other models did cause
slightly increased overshoot, than the referent model.
• The influence of instrument transformer models is relatively negligible (or small)
on normalized error index. The same holds true for the influence on DC gain
and aggregated frequency index.
3. Decision Making Element Performance Indices
Values of performance indices for decision making element of IED model A are shown
in Tables XX through XXII. Note: mentioned performance indices for decision mak-
ing element need a further clarification. Basis criteria is defined in Chapter IV.
Meaning of indices in Tables XX through XXII is:
• N1 is number of correct trip assertions for faults in forward direction of protec-
tion
• F1 is number of incorrect trip restrains for faults in forward direction
• N2 is number of correct trip restrains for faults in backward direction
• F2 is number of incorrect trip assertions for faults in backward direction
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• s1 is defined as:
s1 =
N1
Nforward
(7.1)
• s2 is defined as:
s2 =
N2
Nbackward
(7.2)
where Nforward = 48 is number of faults simulated in forward zone of protection, and
Nbackward = 16 is number of faults simulated in backward zone. Ideal IED performance
would produce N1 = 48 and N2 = 16. The rest of performance indices are listed and
defined in Chapter IV.
The following conclusions can be made, based on the results:
• Current transformer model 2 caused the poorest performance of IED model.
Detection of ABCG faults is impacted the most, while AG and BC faults are
detected slightly better. The influence of current transformer model 2 is de-
grading IED model performance to unacceptable levels in the case of all three
faults.
• Current transformer models, other than current transformer model 2, showed
no influence on decision making element of IED model A. Current transformer
model 4 did lower selectivity of IED model in backward zone slightly.
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Table XX. Overcurrent decision element, ABCG fault
Model N1 F1 N2 F2 s1 s2 t[s]
Referent 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.021
CT 1 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.025
CT 2 32 16 12 4 0.667 0.750 0.023
CT 3 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.022
CT 4 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.019
CCVT 1 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.021
CCVT 2 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.021
CCVT 3 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.021
CCVT 4 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.021
Table XXI. Overcurrent decision element, AG fault
Model N1 F1 N2 F2 s1 s2 t[s]
Referent 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.009
CT 1 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.010
CT 2 43 5 9 7 0.896 0.563 0.012
CT 3 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.009
CT 4 48 0 13 3 1 0.813 0.012
CCVT 1 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.009
CCVT 2 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.009
CCVT 3 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.009
CCVT 4 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.009
Table XXII. Overcurrent decision element, BC fault
Model N1 F1 N2 F2 s1 s2 t[s]
Referent 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.024
CT 1 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.028
CT 2 32 16 16 0 0.667 1 0.059
CT 3 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.025
CT 4 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.046
CCVT 1 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.024
CCVT 2 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.024
CCVT 3 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.024
CCVT 4 48 0 16 0 1 1 0.024
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C. Impact on the IED Model B
IED model B has output available only for decision making elements. Values of
performance indices for decision making element of IED model B are shown in Tables
XXIII through XXV. Meaning of indices in Tables XX through XXII, based on
criteria defined in Chapter IV, is:
• N1 is number of correct trip assertions for faults in primary zone of protection
• F1 is number of trip assertions with incorrect time-delay, for faults in primary
zone of protection (faults detected as belonging to backup zone)
• N2 is number of correct trip assertions for faults in backup zone of protection
• F2 is number of trip assertions with incorrect time-delay, for faults in backup
zone of protection (faults detected as belonging to primary zone)
• s1 is defined as:
s1 =
N1
Nprimary
(7.3)
• s2 is defined as:
s2 =
N2
Nbackup
(7.4)
where Nprimary = 32 is number of faults simulated in primary zone of protection, and
Nbackup = 32 is number of faults simulated in backup zone. Ideal IED performance
would produce N1 = 32 and N2 = 32. Indices t1 and t2 are average tripping times for
faults in primary and backup zones, respectively (average tripping time is calculated
only for correct trip assertions). In cases where t2 could not be calculated because
of IED model misoperation (e.g. none of the faults in zone 2 were recognized), an
asterisk (*) was placed in the Table entries (corresponding to the mentioned cases).
The following conclusions can be made, based on the results:
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Table XXIII. Distance decision element, ABCG fault
Model N1 F1 N2 F2 s1 s2 t1[s] t2[s]
Referent 32 0 28 4 1 0.875 0.017 0.043
CT 1 32 0 32 0 1 1 0.018 0.043
CT 2 32 0 0 32 1 0 0.016 *
CT 3 32 0 32 0 1 1 0.018 0.043
CT 4 32 0 0 32 1 0 0.015 *
CCVT 1 32 0 28 4 1 0.875 0.017 0.043
CCVT 2 32 0 32 0 1 1 0.017 0.043
CCVT 3 32 0 28 4 1 0.875 0.017 0.043
CCVT 4 32 0 28 4 1 0.875 0.017 0.043
Table XXIV. Distance decision element, AG fault
Model N1 F1 N2 F2 s1 s2 t1[s] t2[s]
Referent 32 0 32 0 1 1 0.035 0.043
CT 1 24 8 32 0 0.750 1 0.039 0.043
CT 2 17 15 32 0 0.531 1 0.035 0.043
CT 3 32 0 32 0 1 1 0.036 0.043
CT 4 20 12 32 0 0.625 1 0.037 0.043
CCVT 1 32 0 32 0 1 1 0.034 0.043
CCVT 2 32 0 32 0 1 1 0.035 0.043
CCVT 3 32 0 32 0 1 1 0.034 0.043
CCVT 4 32 0 32 0 1 1 0.034 0.043
Table XXV. Distance decision element, BC fault
Model N1 F1 N2 F2 s1 s2 t1[s] t2[s]
Referent 32 0 28 4 1 0.875 0.017 0.043
CT 1 32 0 32 0 1 1 0.018 0.043
CT 2 32 0 8 24 1 0.250 0.017 0.040
CT 3 32 0 32 0 1 1 0.018 0.043
CT 4 32 0 14 18 1 0.438 0.017 0.040
CCVT 1 32 0 28 4 1 0.875 0.017 0.043
CCVT 2 32 0 32 0 1 1 0.017 0.043
CCVT 3 32 0 28 4 1 0.875 0.017 0.043
CCVT 4 32 0 28 4 1 0.875 0.017 0.043
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• From performance of IED model B connected to referent instrument transform-
ers, it can be seen that IED model shows small overreach for ABCG and BC
fault types (selectivity in zone 2 is 87.5 %). However, IED model B showed no
overreach effects when connected to current transformer models 1 and 3, and
CCVT model 2. It can be concluded that mentioned instrument transformer
models have positive influence on IED model B. However, this positive influence
of mentioned instrument transformer models does not remove IED model’s in-
herent internal problem of overreach. If the IED model B had not been tested
using the referent model, the inherent overreach would not be discovered. Men-
tioned instrument transformer models masked (hid) the overreach.
• Current transformer models 2 and 4 caused IED model to overreach complete
zone 2 for ABCG fault type. The reason for this is larger error in measurement,
cause by mentioned current transformer models.
D. Conclusion
This chapter presented results from application of the evaluation methodology. Re-
sults were obtained using the simulation environment. Methodology is described in
Chapter V, while simulation environment is presented in Chapter VI. Results confirm
existing observation about influence of instrument transformers of IED performance.
Results also point-out to some new aspects of this influence, which have not been
presented in literature so far.
Observations that can be made, based on results from the application of method-
ology, are:
• Influence of various instrument transformer models differs significantly. In gen-
eral, CCVT models (which include models of voltage transformers) have sig-
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nificantly smaller impact on IED model performance. This indicates that in
practice, voltage transforming devices (voltage transformers and CCVTs) are
expected to cause IED misoperations in extremely small number of cases. It can
be hard to even detect these influences using field-recorded data. Simulation
environment is, therefore, a useful tool in analyzing situations when corrupting
influence of CCVTs is suspected.
• Influence of current transformer models varies significantly from one model to
another. Main cause of differences are model parameters. In general, burden
magnitude and VI characteristic of electromagnetic core are two major sources
of corruptive instrument transformer influence. This is confirmed by the results.
• Saturation, phenomena associated with current transformers, actually enhances
certain aspects of current transformer response. Results have shown that, for
example, measuring algorithm suppresses the DC offset better for input signals
supplied from a saturated current transformer. Simulation environment is a
useful tool in further researching of this effect.
• Distortions in IED input signals may lead to a better IED performance, com-
pared to performance of IED supplied with undistorted input signals. Even
though this may seem as a desired influence of instrument transformers, it is
not. Bad performance (such as overreaching, which was demonstrated in the
results) can be masked, i.e. not detected, when connected to current transform-
ers that cause signal distortions. This is an important observation for transient
testing of IEDs. Simulation environment can be used as supplement to existing
testing tools to investigate transient response of the protective relays in more
detail, regarding the mentioned hiding (masking).
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Conclusion is that results, delivered by simulation environment, are comprehen-
sive and meaningful. It was presented how various instrument transformer aspects
influence elements of IEDs, and how this influence shapes the performance of IEDs.
Therefore, simulation environment was shown, through application, to be a useful
and novel tool for analysis of the influence of instrument transformers on protective
IED performance.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
A. Summary
Instrument transformers (IT) are crucial components of power protection system.
Their objective is to supply scaled-down replicas of power network current and voltage
signals. Depending on accuracy of these replicas, faulty conditions are recognized
and properly and timely dealt with by protection system. This, in turn, affects the
operation of power system.
Conventional instrument transformer are based on electromagnetic coupling be-
tween power network on the primary side, and protective devices on the secondary
side. Side-effect of this coupling are signal distortions. Protective devices and other
IEDs are sensitive to these distortions. This sensitivity can lead to misoperation,
which consequently, may lead to disruption of power system operation.
A way of overcoming this problem is introducing novel, optical instrument trans-
formers, called transducers. The improvement, made possible by the new current
and voltage sensing technology, is enabling distortion-free replicas of signals from
the primary side of transducers. However, these improvements are still barely tested
through field application experiences.
There is still an uncertainty about whether the new technology is superior to the
conventional one. This uncertainty is summarized by questions:
1. What is the difference in performance between the conventional instrument
transformers and novel, optical transducers ?
2. How can this difference be practically measured or evaluated ?
Existing approaches to solving the problem, available in the literature, do not
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offer systematic and comprehensive answers to these questions. On the other hand,
the answer is necessary to asses benefits of the new technology. This thesis pro-
poses a new methodology for evaluation of influence of instrument transformers on
IED performance. Existing approaches focus mostly on evaluation of either instru-
ment transformer response, or IED performance. Difference between methodology
presented in this thesis and existing ones, is that the proposed methodology is com-
bining mentioned approaches into unique a procedure. This procedure can lead to
answers to the mentioned questions.
While developing and applying the methodology, several steps were taken. Steps
are described in various chapters of this thesis. First, instrument transformer per-
formance characteristics were analyzed in Chapter II. It was shown that instrument
transformer performance characteristics are the root of distortions. Various instru-
ment transformer designs were discussed. Three performance characteristics were
identified as having the major impact on generation of distortions: accuracy, fre-
quency bandwidth and transient response. Impact of mentioned characteristics on
distortions was described. It was concluded that distortions can be significant.
Sensitivity of protective devices to distortions was addressed in Chapter III. It
was shown that protective devices do not show degradation in performance when ex-
posed to signal distorted up to a certain threshold level. However, distortion levels
above the threshold cause IEDs to miss-operate. Miss-operation includes unaccept-
ably high increase of operationing time and/or unacceptably low selectivity. It was
concluded that distortions caused by conventional instrument transformers can lead
to IED misoperation.
Criteria and new methodology for evaluation of the influence of instrument trans-
formers was presented in Chapter IV. Criteria was defined for measuring and decision
making elements of protective IEDs. Some problems, when calculating numerical val-
118
ues for the criteria, and how to overcome the problems were also addressed. The new
methodology covered important aspects of evaluation: 1) why is evaluation impor-
tant, 2) what are the means for quantifying the influence (finding numerical values), 3)
what is the best procedure for finding the quantitative values of the influence, 4) what
is the meaning of the quantitative values. It was concluded that new methodology
presents systematic and comprehensive approach to the problem solution.
Simulation approach to evaluation was described in Chapter V. Main aspects
of simulation, models and scenarios, were discussed. First, simulation procedure was
discussed. Power network, instrument transformer and IED models were presented,
along with reasoning for the choice. Simulation scenarios were presented next. It was
concluded that, by proper choice of models and proper scenario definitions, meaningful
results can be obtained through simulation.
Simulation environment, which presents software implementation of the method-
ology, was presented in Chapter VI. The environment enables seamless interaction be-
tween several software packages. The environment is implemented in form of software
modules. Three main modules, exposure generator, exposure replayer and statistical
analyzer, were described in detail. Particular importance was placed on description of
I/O data structure and flowchart. These aspects are important for the users who wish
to modify or expand the environment. It was concluded that environment presents a
useful tool for application of the methodology.
Application of evaluation methodology was presented in Chapter VII. Results
obtained through simulation were presented. Results both confirmed existing observa-
tions and offered some new insights, considering influence of instrument transformers
on protective IEDs. New insights include: certain distortions (such as the one caused
by saturation) can be detected by analyzing numerical values of performance indices,
instrument transformers can mask (hide) bad IED performance. It was concluded
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that simulation environment can be used for obtaining meaningful and comprehen-
sive results.
Thesis contributions are both theoretical and practical. Both contributions are
summarized in the next section.
B. Contribution
At present, there is no comprehensive and systematic methodology for evaluation of
the influence of instrument transformers on protective IEDs. The main contribution
of this thesis is a new methodology for evaluation.
Theoretical contributions of the thesis are:
• Connection between instrument transformer characteristics, signal distortions
and IED sensitivity was established (Chapters II and III). It was shown that
instrument transformer characteristic have direct impact on IED performance,
and therefore may affect power system operation.
• Criteria and methodology for evaluation of the influence of instrument trans-
formers was defined (Chapter IV). Criteria was defined in form of numerical
performance indices. Methodology was defined through steps for the evaluation
procedure.
Practical contributions of the thesis are:
• Modelling and simulation approach to evaluation of influence of instrument
transformers was established (Chapter V). It was shown how to choose models
in order to achieve meaningful results through simulation.
• Simulation environment was developed (Chapter VI). Environment is in the
form of software modules. Environment was shown to be a useful tool in ana-
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lyzing influence of instrument transformers. Other benefits of the environment
include its modifiability and expendability.
• Methodology was applied through simulations, using developed simulation en-
vironment (Chapter VII). It was shown that this approach can successfully
provide information about influence of instrument transformer characteristics
on IED performance. The results can be used for further research.
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APPENDIX A
C ** FAULT DATA START **
/BRANCH
C ** CT MODEL CONNECTION DATA START **
-1SKY3A SKY1A .435942.00994.3725150.69 0 0 0
-2SKY3B SKY1B .06143 .56647.6245150.69 0 0 0
-3SKY3C SKY1C 0
C ** CT MODEL START **
/BRANCH
CTS1A CTSA 8.33 .175 0
/BRANCH
CTS1B CTSB 8.33 .175 0
/BRANCH
CTS1C CTSC 8.33 .175 0
/BRANCH
96 CTS1A 0.0 0.0 0
$INCLUDE, C:\ATP37\atp2\models\HYST_2.pch
96 CTS1B 0.0 0.0 0
$INCLUDE, C:\ATP37\atp2\models\HYST_2.pch
96 CTS1C 0.0 0.0 0
$INCLUDE, C:\ATP37\atp2\models\HYST_2.pch
/SOURCE
14CTS1A 1E-10 60. -1. 10.
18 180.SKY3A CTPA
14CTS1B 1E-10 60. -1. 10.
18 180.SKY3B CTPB
14CTS1C 1E-10 60. -1. 10.
18 180.SKY3C CTPC
/SWITCH
CTSA MEASURING 1
CTSB MEASURING 1
CTSC MEASURING 1
SKYA CTPA MEASURING 1
SKYB CTPB MEASURING 1
SKYC CTPC MEASURING 1
C ** CT MODEL END **
C == CCVT MODEL START ==
/BRANCH
N2A N3A 228. 0
N1A SKYA .82938 0
N1A 32.497 0
N1A N2A 21997. 0
N1A N3A .03770 0
N3A 5.7E-8 0
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TRANSFORMER TA0001 5.E5 0
9999
1N3A 400. 1131. 8.586
2VTA .2 .377 .112
N5A VTA 3600. 0
N5A VTA 263.89 0
N5A 37.5 0
VTA 100. 0
N2B N3B 228. 0
N1B SKYB .82938 0
N1B 32.497 0
N1B N2B 21997. 0
N1B N3B .03770 0
N3B 5.7E-8 0
TRANSFORMER TB0001 5.E5 0
9999
1N3B 400. 1131. 8.586
2VTB .2 .377 .112
N5B VTB 3600. 0
N5B VTB 263.89 0
N5B 37.5 0
VTB 100. 0
N2C N3C 228. 0
N1C SKYC .82938 0
N1C 32.497 0
N1C N2C 21997. 0
N1C N3C .03770 0
N3C 5.7E-8 0
TRANSFORMER TC0001 5.E5 0
9999
1N3C 400. 1131. 8.586
2VTC .2 .377 .112
N5C VTC 3600. 0
N5C VTC 263.89 0
N5C 37.5 0
VTC 100. 0
/OUTPUT
SKYA SKYB SKYC VTA VTB VTC
C == CCVT MODEL END ==
/BRANCH
C ** CT MODEL CONNECTION DATA END **
-1SKY1A STPA .435942.00994.372516.744 0 0 0
-2SKY1B STPB .06143 .56647.624516.744 0 0 0
-3SKY1C STPC 0
/SWITCH
SKY1A SKY1B .064583 10. 0
/BRANCH
/SWITCH
SKY1B SKY1C .064583 10. 0
/BRANCH
/SWITCH
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SKY1A SKY2A .064583 10. 0
/BRANCH
/BRANCH
SKY2A 5. 0
C ** FAULT DATA END **
129
VITA
Bogdan Naodovic was born in 1977 in Novi Sad, Yugoslavia. He received his
Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering (Diploma of Engineering) from
the Faculty of Technical Sciences, University of Novi Sad, Yugoslavia, on December
29, 2001. In undergraduate studies, he majored in telecommunications.
Bogdan Naodovic entered graduate school at Texas A&M University in the Sum-
mer of 2002. His emphasis in graduate school was in the area of power systems and
instrument transformers. During his graduate studies, he worked on various research
assignments as a research assistant. He was also Power System Control and Protection
Lab manager.
Author’s address:
Texas A&M University
Department of Electrical Engineering
College Station, Texas 77843-3128
